[EM] electoral college/Serious thoughts

[Dave Ketchum]

I am looking at responses from Curt, Paul, and Adam.  They seem to think I 
have it wrong, but I see nothing useful as to WHAT I have wrong.

Paul notes that two states elect electors by CD, which he calls 
proportional, and wants all states to do this.
      Given a state with 8 CDs, each voting 60 A and 40 B, he would elect 
10 A electors (remember the two senatorial).
      Doing actual proportional, I would do 6 A and 4 B electors.  This 
should more closely match the popular vote, plus allow possibility of 
minor party electors (who could have promised how they would respond once 
it was clear their nominee was not about to become President).

Paul seems to offer nothing as to how his idea becomes salable to a state 
such as NY, which now elects only Dem electors - while he wants NY to do 
some Rep electors.

Curt has a minor complaint about what Paul offers.

Adam seems to dream of some magic that would make an amendment doable:
      His magic is not convincing.
      Needs clarification as to how 3/N and 54/M are even useful in magic.

Adam dreams that a near tie in a popular vote national election is not 
worth preparing for:
      There HAS to be a law somewhere that the bigger the problem 
associated with not being prepared, the greater the odds of the event 
happening.
      Remember that near tie is not an absolute number, but based on how 
big a change might result from a recount.

On Wed, 28 Apr 2004 00:11:05 -0400 I wrote:

> First I hit some serious topics; then I comment on some of what Curt & 
> Adam wrote:
>      Destroying the EC is neither practical nor useful.
>      There are doable improvements for the EC.
>      IRV people need to be locked out of this debate.
> 
> Practical nor useful?
>      Not practical, for it requires at least some of the low population 
> states to approve a Constitutional amendment that gives them less voice 
> in electing a President.
>      What lies down this path - electing by nationwide popular vote? 
> Then you get nationwide suffering with near ties like Florida got in 
> 2000 with a near tie.
> 
> Doable?
>      Article II.2 authorizes each state Legislature to see to appointing 
> electors.  It says almost NOTHING as to how they should go about this.
>      Note that, per Amendment XII, the House (or Senate) DO NOT get to 
> pick some stranger when they get to pick - they pick from the candidates 
> getting the most EC votes.
> 
> So - what to do:
>      NOTHING as to mechanics of doing the election.
>      Appoint EC members proportionally in each state, per popular vote. 
> Whoever nominates a slate of EC candidates produces an ordered list so 
> that, should their candidate get half the vote, first half of their list 
> gets appointed.
>      It is EXPECTED that whoever nominates EC candidates will have them 
> committed to reasonableness:
>           Major party EC candidates likely promise to vote for their 
> party's candidates.
>           Other party EC candidates likely promise to vote for their 
> party's candidates if there is a chance of winning; else whatever was 
> agreed to when they became a candidate.
> 
> Actually doing:
>      Swing states might do the above, since it does not give any special 
> advantage to any party.
>      States such as NY could not afford to give the Republicans the 
> unfair advantage of getting some NY EC votes; NY could consider 
> partnering with states that would give comparable aid to the Democrats.
>      This thought is possible ammunition for a Constitutional amendment.
> 
> Lockout IRV?
>      The above proportional election of EC members is better than any 
> IRV dream I have heard of,
> 
> On Tue, 27 Apr 2004 17:32:23 -0700 Curt Siffert wrote per
>     Subject :Re: [EM] electoral college/ two-party-duopoly   
> 
>>
>> On Apr 27, 2004, at 4:55 PM, Adam H Tarr wrote:
>>
>>> Curt wrote:
>>>
>>>> [ The first issue really illustrates what I find so impossible about
>>>> IRV advocates, because many of them advocate IRV *in presidential
>>>> elections*, but *before* removing the EC.  Implementing IRV in pres.
>>>> elections on a state level, without changing the EC, has *no* effect
>>>> whatsoever,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Not so.  It could swing an election from one major party to another in a
>>> swing state, by transferring the votes of a wing party.  To take 2000 as
>>> an easy example: give Gore the Nader votes, and he as a clear majority in
>>> Florida.
>>
>>
>>
>> I should have been more clear - Such an IRV scheme has no effect on
>> making it more likely their candidate will win or that their interests 
>> will
>> be reflected.  They can't win the EC until they have 270 EVs, at which
>> point they're not exactly a third party anymore.
>>
>>> There is an argument that IRV perpetuates a two-party system almost as
>>> well as plurality does.  That's a bad thing in general, but in the
>>> isolated case of trying to avoid elections being sent to the House, 
>>> it's a
>>> good thing.
>>
>>
> 
> How is getting the House involved on near ties a crime?
> 
>>
>> What pro-IRV argument makes sent-to-House elections less likely?
>>
>>> 1) Some small states actually get under-represented in the EC, due to
>>> being just short of getting an extra representative.  So the EC is
>>> actually pretty erratic in this regard.
>>
>>
>>
>> Yes, apportionment is sort of arbitrary.  The ratio of representatives to
>> senators is arbitrary - the House scaled with population for a while, then
>> just turned the scaling off.
> 
> 
> 
> This puzzles.  The small state has to rate ONE extra House member to 
> rate ONE extra EC member - still ahead of NY, etc.
> 
>>
>>> 3) People tend to associate small states with rural populations and
>>> certain interests, but the EC is a very crude tool at best if increasing
>>> the representation of those interests.  And why should they get a larger
>>> say, anyway?
>>
>>
>>
>> There are strong arguments on both sides of this question.  I actually
>> think less populated states should get a higher representation ratio
>> for environmental reasons.  But yes, the EC's current implementation
>> of this aim is crude and bad.
>>
>> If I were to overhaul it and still keep the EC, I'd award each state's EVs
>> proportionally according to the placement of each candidate in that
>> state.  According to that scheme, by the way, Bush just barely won in
>> 2000 (spoiled by Nader) - Gore actually won more of the ultra-close
>> states in 2000.  I'd figure the placement of each candidate with a better
>> voting scheme.  (Thus my question about normalizing placement of
>> multiple candidates on a 100-point scale a few threads ago.)  I'd
>> re-apportion the EVs to more accurately reflect the population.  I'd want
>> some way to come up with a more thoughtful compromise/ratio between
>> popular and regional representation (less arbitrary than 435:100).
>>
> I agree as to proportional.  Not clear how you can make a better voting 
> scheme for this purpose.
> 
> BTW - the House has stumbled into 435 - they might decide that is too 
> many for a legislative body without asking how it would affect the EC.
> 
>>> So, the EC should be abolished, but that's not news around here.
>>
>>
>>
>> On the contrary, there are many Condorcet advocates that might not
>> support the abolishment of the EC under all circumstances.  I think it's
>> superior to a nationwide popular (plurality) vote, for instance.
>>
>>>>  Sure, perhaps too stable, but I personally do find it a
>>>> hard argument to make that a multiple-party legislative body is clearly
>>>> and incontrovertibly better than a two-party legislative body.  When I
>>>> see the nature of some of the power-sharing alliance agreements in some
>>>> parliamentary bodies with many small parties, it doesn't seem to do a
>>>> much better job of democratically representing the population than a
>>>> two-party body (this reaches the outer limits of my study and I don't
>>>> have many examples to draw on; the only one I find myself thinking of
>>>> in this regard is Israel's).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The unstable parliamentary democracies are the ones where the ruling
>>> coalition needs to maintain a majority so that it can form a government.
>>> Even if we had 50 parties in the house, there would still be no need for
>>> this.  Sure, they'd have to think of new rules for forming committees and
>>> such, but the executive branch is elected seperately in the USA, so all
>>> those stability issues are not a problem.
>>
>>
>>
>> That is a good point, I will remember this one.  Our leader doesn't by 
>> definition
>> come from our ruling congressional party.
>>
>>> ...if you put more diverse opinions on the floor, that are more
>>> representative of the people, then you give the people more choices about
>>> how the government is run.  Right now, (to pick an example out of a hat)
>>> voters can't easily elect a representative to congress who will oppose
>>> affirmative action but support abortion rights.  If I have those 
>>> opinions,
>>> I'm probably going to end up voting for a candidate who will misrepresent
>>> me on one of them.  More parties would solve many such connundrums.
>>
>>
>>
>> I agree, but the point against such an arrangement is that it could spur
>> even greater gridlock within the legislative body.
>>
>>>> In short, is it not possible to simply reform the two-party duopoly
>>>> rather than get rid of it entirely?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I really don't think so... as long as you have two parties, you
>>> essentially force the voters to tie their decisions on every issue
>>> together and cast one vote, even if they disagree with 49% of those
>>> decisions.
>>
>>
>>
>> However, in a representative democracy, this is kind of the point.
>> Part of my input has already been accounted for in earlier elections -
>> primaries and the like.  And so, my representative in DC isn't really
>> expected to represent *me*, he's expected to represent the consensus
>> of which I am a part.  I expect to not fit that mold exactly.
>>
>> Whereas in a legislative body of hundreds of representatives, one of
>> whom might represent me exactly, they'd all be very different from each
>> other, and I wouldn't expect any of the body's results to be everything
>> that my representative wants.
>>
>> So I don't see how it's clearly better.  I see Condorcet as inarguably 
>> better
>> than Plurality and IRV, but I don't see multi-party representation as 
>> inarguably
>> better than a two-party "duopoly".
>>
> Something immediately above puzzles - most of this thread is about 
> President and EC, which does not care much about how many parties.
>     Electing House and Senate is where duopoly gets active, and where 
> ranked ballots could do some good.
> 
>> - Curt

-- 
  davek at clarityconnect.com    people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
            Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
                  If you want peace, work for justice.