[EM] Primaries?

Bart Ingles bartman at netgate.net
Tue Mar 30 00:02:43 PST 2004


Dave Ketchum wrote:
> 
> -------- Original Message --------
> From: Bart Ingles <bartman at netgate.net>
> To: EM List <election-methods at electorama.com>
> Subject: [EM] Argument for Approval Primaries
> Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 09:49:40 -0800
> 
> It occurs to me that one place where ranked ballot methods are entirely
> unsuitable is in party primary elections.  Here neither the CW nor the
> SU maximizer are necessarily winnable choices, which seems to moot those
> criteria.  A similar statement applies to any determinate system.
> 
> ...
> -------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> Disagreed!  If a method is "good enough" to select a single winner in the
> general election, then it must be good enough, and most logical choice,
> for use in related primaries.  While the details are a bit different in
> primaries, the basic issue is to select the best candidate as seen by the
> voters.

That's a non sequitur, as Adam has already pointed out.  "Good enough"
for the general election does not imply "good enough" for the primary. 
It's easy enough to show how a system using Condorcet in both the
primary and general election can fail to elect the overall sincere
Condorcet winner-- in fact it would be fairly common whenever one of the
major parties is split between an extreme and a moderate faction.

If using approval voting in the primary encourages people to vote
strategically with the general election in mind, then Approval may well
be better than even Condorcet at making sure that the sincere Condorcet
winner survives to run in the general election.

Bart



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