[EM] G-S theorem and random ballot
Joe Weinstein
jweins123 at hotmail.com
Thu Mar 18 13:34:01 PST 2004
Re: G-S theorem and random ballot
In message 13820 (Sat. 13 March 2004), Markus Schulze wrote:
"...a single-winner election method is dictatorial if there exists a
probability distribution p[1],...,p[V] on the set of voters so that,
independently on how the voters vote, ... voter i is chosen with probability
p[i] and the winner is chosen from the top-ranked candidates of this voter.
So random ballot is dictatorial."
In message 13860 (Mon. 15 March 2004), Forest Simmons responded:
So this is one of those cases where the technical meaning of a word is not
as bad as it sounds. A dictator in this context is just someone who gets to
have his turn at choosing ... a far cry from the dictators that are conjured
up in the popular mind when it first hears of the "Dictator Theorem."
When we, as children, drew straws to decide who would choose the next game
for our little group to play, we had no idea that some folks would consider
the practice so undemocratic as to think of us as little dictators in the
making.
He who chooses the terminology may have undue influence on the popular
interpretation of the result. Suppose that the randomly chosen voter were
called the "representative" instead of the "dictator." Then the Dictator
Theorem would be called the Representative Theorem. But of course it would
lose all of its sex appeal, and would be buried in the annals of voting
theory without ever coming into public notice.
Yes, and there are some ironies which strengthen Forest's point.
Suppose the contested office is one which has reserved to it some unique
decision powers - as here in California for each of the elective executive
state offices. Regardless of whether the election method is dictatorial
or not, the winner of the office then gets to play dictator over his
reserved domain. So it seems that ALL single-winner election methods can be
viewed as 'dictatorial'.
Theres more. Consider a jurisdiction dominated by a single political party
which in turn is dominated by one or a few party bosses. Or, suppose - as
here in California - the major parties agree on safe-district redistricting
plans which preserve advantages to incumbents and to locally majority
parties. In either case, a sexy non-random non-dictatorial method will
nicely suit the actual dictator(s), whereas an unsexy random dictator
method will frustrate them.
Thats right: a non-dictatorial method can guarantee dictatorship, and a
dictatorial method can frustrate it.
Joe Weinstein
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