[EM] Arrow's axioms

Philippe Errembault phil.errembault at skynet.be
Fri Mar 5 15:02:05 PST 2004


Arrow's axioms do NOT apply to real world, since he wants to make ranked results from ranked individual choices, while strict ranking of preferences is incompatible with human nature.

We all would find very difficult to make a strict and fixed order of preference between different choices. All preference are based on multidimensionnal criterions, and to order them you must choose a ponderation, which are by the human nature NOT fixed. In those conditions, making an election is not more than multiplying the number of dimensions by the number of voters. So, I see no reason why we should restrict to a strict preference order in the community choice, if we are not able to make it in an indiviual choice.

I'm currently working on a fully different way of implementing democracy. This idea is not based on a vote system as we know it, and is much more repectful of human nature. There are still a few problems with it, but it would solve many of the problems with the election systems. (it works a little like a neural structure)

Philippe Errembault
  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Ken Johnson 
  To: election-methods-electorama.com at electorama.com 
  Sent: Friday, March 05, 2004 7:34 PM
  Subject: [EM] Arrow's axioms




Date: Thu, 4 Mar 2004 23:27:06 +0100 (CET)
From: =?iso-8859-1?q?Kevin=20Venzke?= <stepjak at yahoo.fr>
  Arrow's axioms could well be justifiable, but his proof doesn't provide 
the justification. There may be good reasons why CR should be rejected 
as a viable election method, but Arrow's premises don't elucidate those 
reasons because if the theorem were generalized to encompass cardinal 
methods, its conclusion would be that rank methods cannot satisfy the 
axioms whereas CR can.
    
This is like saying "There may be good reasons why Random Ballot should be
rejected as a viable election method, but Arrow's premises don't elucidate
those reasons because if the theorem were generalized to encompass dictatorship
methods, its conclusion would be that non-dictatorial methods cannot satisfy
the axioms whereas Random Ballot can."

I hope it's evident why this is a strange way of speaking.

Kevin Venzke
  
  Kevin,

  It isn't evident. It is reasonable to stipulate non-dictatorship axiomatically because this principle is non-controversial and nobody is championing dictatorship as a viable election method. On the other hand, if the objective of elections is to maximize "social utility", then CR probably represents the simplest and most natural way to measure (or at least define) social utility, and it should not be excluded from consideration axiomatically.

  Ken Johnson

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