[EM] Pseudo-election reform in California

[Dr. Ernie Prabhakar]

Hi Curt,

On Jun 1, 2004, at 11:43 AM, Curt Siffert wrote:
> It seems clear to me that this would be worse than IRV.  IRV and this 
> "French/Louisiana Runoff" method are identical in that there is a 
> second round if there is no majority.
>
> IRV then removes the last-place candidate.  So does French Runoff, 
> except that French Runoff also removes several others; all of which 
> had more first-place support than the IRV loser.
>
> Since much of the flaw of IRV is that it eliminates the person with 
> the least first-place votes, without looking at that candidate's 
> down-ticket support, then eliminating *multiple* people based only on 
> their first-place votes only exacerbates this.  IRV is better than 
> this method because at least it allows a third-place candidate with 
> greater consensus support to have a better shot in later rounds.
>
> (This is assuming that the plan is for all *general election 
> candidates* to run together in one single primary, and that if one 
> gets a majority, the general is skipped.  And this is assuming that 
> this is compared against another similar primary of all general 
> election candidates, counted by IRV.)

I suspect both your assumptions are wrong, at least in the California 
case.   The primary is just a primary - there will be a general 
election with the top two, no matter how much of the vote they get.   
This reflects the fact that more people participate in general 
elections than in primaries.

I agree that Plurality in the first round suffers from all the same 
problems as Plurality in the final election.   So, my question is -- if 
people *want* a two-round system, what is the most efficient election 
method to use?  I think Ranked Ballots are probably optimal, but 
Condorcet is designed for single-winner elections. Is Condorcet still 
the best way to determine the optimal dual-winners, if the goal is to 
reflect the diversity of the electorate (vs. just the two most 
acceptable to everyone)?  Or would some form of IRV or STV accomplish 
that goal?

Put another way -- I'm trying to figure out the optimal way to help 
these reformers achieve *their* goals, rather than trying to get them 
to -change- their goals.   Any suggestions?

-- Ernie P.


>
> Curt
>
>
> On Jun 1, 2004, at 11:15 AM, Dr. Ernie Prabhakar wrote:
>
>>>  I should add best-two-runoff to my sims to check that. I bet it's 
>>> worse than IRV. It's probably analytically provably worse than IRV.
>>
>> But, I suspect you are using idealized consistent voters, and a 
>> relatively uniform electorate.   Given the size and diversity of 
>> California, an open final election would likely have very different 
>> financial and political dynamics than an open primary.   I suspect it 
>> costs a lot more money and organizational skill to try to appeal to a 
>> general electorate rather than a well-defined core constituency, 
>> which perversely plays -into- the hands of the dominant parties (as 
>> we more or less saw during the Reca
>
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