[EM] Pseudo-election reform in California
Curt Siffert
siffert at museworld.com
Tue Jun 1 12:28:01 PDT 2004
Regarding California/French Runoff:
Yes, this is the part that makes is difficult to make an
apples-to-apples comparison with IRV. I agree.
On Jun 1, 2004, at 11:54 AM, Dr. Ernie Prabhakar wrote:
> ... people participate in general elections than in primaries.
So, I guess I would qualify as saying, assuming voters' down-ticket
preferences would remain static from primary to general, and assuming
the same number of participants in French runoff (both of which are
lousy assumptions), then IRV would be better.
As for the best method to use for a two-round primary, then I would
think that some Condorcet variant would be best. In the primary, find
the Condorcet winner. Then eliminate the Condorcet winner from all
ballots, and find the new Condorcet winner. These two would be in the
runoff. In the case of circular ties in either step, you'd have to use
one of the many tiebreakers that are discussed here.
If the primary doesn't have ranked ballots and the folks want two
rounds, then I think this French Runoff is the best solution. In the
chance that ranked ballots are unavailable but Approval ballots are,
then Approval would be better for the primary.
Overall, French Runoff is better than plurality. I think the consensus
of general ranking is (from worst to best) of seven often discussed
methods here is:
1. Plurality
2. French Runoff
3. IRV
4. Tactical Rated
5. Approval
6. Condorcet
7. Non-tactical Rated
Tangent - I personally have a lower opinion of Approval because I think
it is hard to sell to voting populations. "Wait, ranking this guy
equal could mean he beats my first choice." It puts voters in the
uncomfortable position of having to choose between separating their
loves-and-compromises from their hates, and separating their loves from
their compromises-and-hates. Voters don't like that choice, it feels
like a risky catch-22. It's a psychological problem. Using Approval
for a French-Runoff primary, however, reduces that psychological flaw.
I like that idea a lot.
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