[EM] Pseudo-election reform in California

Curt Siffert siffert at museworld.com
Tue Jun 1 12:28:01 PDT 2004


Regarding California/French Runoff:

Yes, this is the part that makes is difficult to make an 
apples-to-apples comparison with IRV.  I agree.

On Jun 1, 2004, at 11:54 AM, Dr. Ernie Prabhakar wrote:

> ... people participate in general elections than in primaries.

So, I guess I would qualify as saying, assuming voters' down-ticket 
preferences would remain static from primary to general, and assuming 
the same number of participants in French runoff (both of which are 
lousy assumptions), then IRV would be better.

As for the best method to use for a two-round primary, then I would 
think that some Condorcet variant would be best.  In the primary, find 
the Condorcet winner.  Then eliminate the Condorcet winner from all 
ballots, and find the new Condorcet winner.  These two would be in the 
runoff.  In the case of circular ties in either step, you'd have to use 
one of the many tiebreakers that are discussed here.

If the primary doesn't have ranked ballots and the folks want two 
rounds, then I think this French Runoff is the best solution.  In the 
chance that ranked ballots are unavailable but Approval ballots are, 
then Approval would be better for the primary.

Overall, French Runoff is better than plurality.  I think the consensus 
of general ranking is (from worst to best) of seven often discussed 
methods here is:

1. Plurality
2. French Runoff
3. IRV
4. Tactical Rated
5. Approval
6. Condorcet
7. Non-tactical Rated

Tangent - I personally have a lower opinion of Approval because I think 
it is hard to sell to voting populations.  "Wait, ranking this guy 
equal could mean he beats my first choice."  It puts voters in the 
uncomfortable position of having to choose between separating their 
loves-and-compromises from their hates, and separating their loves from 
their compromises-and-hates.  Voters don't like that choice, it feels 
like a risky catch-22.  It's a psychological problem.  Using Approval 
for a French-Runoff primary, however, reduces that psychological flaw.  
I like that idea a lot.





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