CR == Approval? Re: [EM] Re: Election-methods digest, Vol 1 #517 - 3 msgs
Ernest Prabhakar
drernie at mac.com
Thu Feb 26 11:50:20 PST 2004
Hi Adam ,
> Good work Ernie.
Thanks.
> So this would be just such a case, where due to the extremely precise
> knowledge and the hair's-breadth nature of the election, the marginal
> utility for each additional point for candidate C is not constant. If
> we were to make this election have a plausible level of uncertainty,
> say:
>
>> (I) 40% chance:
>> A: 101,000
>> B: 102,000
>> C: 104,000
>>
>> (II) 60% chance:
>> A: 100,000
>> B: 104,000
>> C: 105,000
>
> Then the optimal strategy is to give B 5 points if the preference gap
> between C and B is at least twice as big as the preference gap between
> A and B, and one point if it is not.
Sure, for an individual voter. But let me pose a question for you.
Say I was the party chieftain for the X party, and my 1,000 loyal
followers (who all prefer A > B > C) ask me how they should vote.
Given the above expected breakdown from other voters, would it not make
sense for me to ask all my followers to vote 5:3:1? (or something
similar, I haven't done the calculation)
-- Ernie P.
More information about the Election-Methods
mailing list