[EM] SciAm article

[Forest Simmons]

On Sat, 14 Feb 2004, Markus Schulze wrote:

> Hallo,
>
> according to Partha Dasgupta's home page, his paper
> "The Fairest Vote of All" is identical to this paper:
> http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/faculty/dasgupta/MajRuVot.pdf

Actually, the Scientific American article is a beefed up version of the
one on his home page.

The recommendation of Copeland as a "tie breaker" and Borda if two
candidates are tied for the most pairwise wins is merely an after thought
that isn't in the original paper [which is better than the published
version in my humble opinion].

Another anomaly in the published version is using "neutrality" to mean
Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives.

The authors eloquently promote the CW as the true majority winner, and
explain their theorem that methods that do not choose the CW are further
from satisfying the IIAC than methods that do.

They also express the believe that the completion method doesn't matter
too much because according to a theorem of Black, Condorcet cycles should
be rare in political elections.

Also the authors express the opinion that strategic considerations are
more of a concern in small group voting and not so much in large scale
elections.

Whoever writes to SciAm should give the authors their due, but point out
that the completion method can make or break Condorcet by encouraging
undue cloning, as well as giving incentives for strategic order reversals
on ballots.

Forest



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