[EM] Condorcet for public proposals - IMV

[Markus Schulze]

Hallo,

in my opinion, Steve Eppley's "Maximize Affirmed Majorities"
(MAM) method would be a very good public proposal:
http://www.alumni.caltech.edu/~seppley

This method satisfies Condorcet, monotonicity, independence of
clones, reversal symmetry, and many other desirable criteria.
Therefore, MAM is a very good method even when a given reader
doesn't consider the Condorcet criterion to be important. In
my opinion, the fact that Smith//MinMax violates independence
of clones is a very serious problem when you have to argue
against IRV.

Unlike e.g. Smith//MinMax, MAM is based on only one principle
and it isn't a combination of different principles.

MAM is a modification of Tideman's ranked pairs method. The
fact that Nicolaus Tideman is a professor at a university in
the USA, the fact that he is a citizen of the USA, and the
fact that his ranked pairs method has already been published
in scientific journals are important campaign strategic
advantages.

"Maximize Affirmed Majorities" is a good fight name. Maybe,
"Maximize Affirmation Method" is better.

In my opinion, for a public proposal those versions of ranked
pairs where at first a "tie-breaking ranking of the candidates"
(TBRC) using the "random voter hierarchy" (RVH) is calculated
and then this TBRC is used to get a complete ranking of the
pairwise defeats are better than those versions where at first
all potential ranked pairs winners are calculated and then
the winner is chosen randomly from the potential winners.
Calculating all potential winners instead of calculating only
one potential winner makes sense only when you have a good
idea what to do with them.

Markus Schulze