[EM] 2nd Richard reply on 13 Feb, GMT

MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp at hotmail.com
Fri Feb 13 03:29:02 PST 2004


Richard--

You said:

Actually I was able to get to those revisions tonight also. It's
possible that I've still made errors in the interpretation of the
electionmethods.org wording, but I hope not. I'm sure I'll hear from
Mike if I did.

I reply:

That much is correct. Plurality still meets all 4 of your versions of the 
majority defensive strategy criteria.

You continued:

SFC: If X is the Condorcet winner of an election, and X is voted over
Y on a majority of the ballots, then however the ballots outside that
majority are modified through collapsing, Y cannot win.

I reply:

In Plurality, the only way to vote X over Y is to vote for X. If a majority 
vote for X, then obviously Y can't have as high a vote total as X. Y can't 
win. Plurality meets your criterion.

If you want votes-only criteria equivalent with mine, you'll probably have 
to do what I suggested:

Stipulate rank balloting, or assume rank balloting even if it's a false 
assumption.

Those are unappealing to me, and would reduce the credibility of the 
criteria.

But I have no objection to your writing such versions of my criteria, if you 
tell people about them in at least those versions. It's better for someone 
to hear your rankings-stipulated or rankings-assumed version of my criteria 
than for that person to not hear of my criteria at all.

You continued:

GSFC: If X is in the Smith set of an election and Y is not in the
Smith set, and X is voted over Y on a majority of the ballots, then
however the ballots outside that majority are modified through
collapsing, Y cannot win.

I reply:

Same as above.

You continued:

SDSC: If X is voted higher than Y on a majority of the ballots, then
either Y does not win, or ballots in that majority can be modified
through any combination of truncation and spreading (without order
reversal) in such a way that Y does not win.

I reply:

Same as above.

You continued:

WDSC: If X is voted higher than Y on a majority of the ballots, then
either Y does not win, or ballots in that majority can be modified
through any combination of collapsing and spreading (without order
reversal) in such a way that Y does not win.

I reply:

Same as above.

Mike Ossipoff

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