[EM] 2nd Richard reply on 13 Feb, GMT
MIKE OSSIPOFF
nkklrp at hotmail.com
Fri Feb 13 03:29:02 PST 2004
Richard--
You said:
Actually I was able to get to those revisions tonight also. It's
possible that I've still made errors in the interpretation of the
electionmethods.org wording, but I hope not. I'm sure I'll hear from
Mike if I did.
I reply:
That much is correct. Plurality still meets all 4 of your versions of the
majority defensive strategy criteria.
You continued:
SFC: If X is the Condorcet winner of an election, and X is voted over
Y on a majority of the ballots, then however the ballots outside that
majority are modified through collapsing, Y cannot win.
I reply:
In Plurality, the only way to vote X over Y is to vote for X. If a majority
vote for X, then obviously Y can't have as high a vote total as X. Y can't
win. Plurality meets your criterion.
If you want votes-only criteria equivalent with mine, you'll probably have
to do what I suggested:
Stipulate rank balloting, or assume rank balloting even if it's a false
assumption.
Those are unappealing to me, and would reduce the credibility of the
criteria.
But I have no objection to your writing such versions of my criteria, if you
tell people about them in at least those versions. It's better for someone
to hear your rankings-stipulated or rankings-assumed version of my criteria
than for that person to not hear of my criteria at all.
You continued:
GSFC: If X is in the Smith set of an election and Y is not in the
Smith set, and X is voted over Y on a majority of the ballots, then
however the ballots outside that majority are modified through
collapsing, Y cannot win.
I reply:
Same as above.
You continued:
SDSC: If X is voted higher than Y on a majority of the ballots, then
either Y does not win, or ballots in that majority can be modified
through any combination of truncation and spreading (without order
reversal) in such a way that Y does not win.
I reply:
Same as above.
You continued:
WDSC: If X is voted higher than Y on a majority of the ballots, then
either Y does not win, or ballots in that majority can be modified
through any combination of collapsing and spreading (without order
reversal) in such a way that Y does not win.
I reply:
Same as above.
Mike Ossipoff
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