[EM] Richard reply, 13 Feb, 1112 GMT

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

Richard--

Regarding your revised versions of the majority defensive strategy criteria:

Ok, but I've already told you how votes-only versions of those criteria can 
be written. I described 2 votes-only ways, in my posting entitled "3 Ways of 
Writing Certain Criteria".

One of those ways involves the counterfactual assumption that all methods 
allow rank balloting, and the other way requires a stipulation of rank 
balloting.

Of those two, the arbitrary stipulation is better than the fiction. But, as 
I said, I don't like either.

But if you can write versions of the defensive strategy criteria that some 
people will like better than my versions of them, that would be a good 
thing. Your wordings, if they eventually really are equivalent to my 
criteria, would be useful for showing the criteia to people who like 
criteria to be written as you like them to be written.

You continued, quoting me:

>I reply:
>
>If, as seems to be the case, based on how it's written, that criterion 
>applies only to rank methods, then, for that reason, it isn't equivalent to 
>SFC.

It should probably include a clause, "The method allows full ranking
of all candidates, and [insert remainder of criterion here]".

I reply:

Yes, stipulating rank balloting is one of the votes-only approaches that I 
suggested several days ago.

It means that rank methods will be the only ones that pass, not because 
there's some specified desirable result that only they give, but simply 
because you decree that only rank methods pass.

With my wordings of SFC, GSFC, & SDSC, rank methods are the only ones that 
pass, for no reason other than that they're the only ones that comply with 
the criteria's results requirements. My criteria say nothing about rules  
requirements. Do you see the difference?

You continued:
>Richard continued:
>
>Note: The statement in the electionmethods.org commentary that
>"Compliance with SDSC means that a majority never needs any more than
>truncation strategy to defeat a particular candidate" is puzzling
>(truncation strategy is "falsely voting two candidates equal", is it
>not?).
>
>I reply:
***

I'd said:

>
>No it is not. If you don't include certain candidates in your ranking, then 
>you aren't voting for them. If you aren't voting for them, then there isn't 
>a compelling case that you're voting them any way, including equal. You're 
>leaving them out equally.

Richard replied:

So you want readers to infer something (that truncation isn't the same
as "voting candidates equal") that isn't implied in the definitions?

I reply:

No, I'd prefer that they _not_  infer something that isn't implied in the 
definitions.

You want to infer that not ranking X & Y is ranking them equal. But not 
mentioning X & Y says  nothing about them, or about whether they're equal to 
eachother. You're inferring that "unranked" is a rank level. I never said 
that. The only thing that I've ever said about what it means to not be 
ranked is that it's widely agreed that a voter who ranks X and not Y is 
casting a pairwise vote for X over Y.

Your notion that not ranking X & Y is voting them equal is an unwarranted 
inference on your part.

However, as I said, I'd like to prevent those before they happen, which is 
why I'll ask Russ to add my definition of voting X & Y equal.

You continued:

Consider this statement, from the same web page: "In order to
understand SFC, one must also understand that there are two types of
insincere votes: false preferences and truncated preferences.

I reply:

Yes, that's in keeping with my definition of sincere voting.

You continued (quoting the website):

Voters
truncate by terminating their rank list before their true preferences
are fully specified (note that the last choice is always implied, so
leaving it out is not considered truncation). Voters falsify their
preferences, on the other hand, by reversing the order of their true
preferences or by specifying a preference they don't really have."

You replied to the above quote:

We
can infer from this that (1) truncated preferences are not false
preferences, since they have their own separate category;

I reply:

We can "infer" that because not not voting a preference that you have, and 
voting a preference that you don't have are 2 different things.

You continued:

and (2)
"voting two candidates equal" is not a case of a falsifying
preference, since it is not enumerated in that category.


I reply:

If you vote 2 candidates at the same rank position, you aren't voting a 
preference between them, false or otherwise.

I carefully specifed that voting a preference for X over Y means voting X 
over Y. If you don't vote X over Y, and you don't vote Y over X, then you 
aren't voting a preference for X over Y or for Y over X.

You continued:

That leaves
wide open the interpretation that truncation is the same as "voting
candidates equal"

I reply:

I suppose it "leaves wide open" anything that anyone wants to say on any 
topic that it doesn't cover.

But you're making a big leap when you say that not listing X and not listing 
Y votes them equal. As I said, not mentioning Joe and not mentioning Moe 
says nothing about them, except that they're both unmentioned. It doesn't 
speak of an order-relation, or lack of, between them. It just doesn't say.

If you don't vote for them at all, you can't accurately say that you've 
"voted them" any way, including "equal". Showing them at the same rank 
position votes for them, and votes them equal.

Your claim depends on your unspoken assumption that "unranked" is a rank 
position, so that 2 candidates unranked are ranked equal. I never said that 
"unranked" is a rank position.

You're right when you say that I didn't say anything about that. But the 
justified default presumption is different from what you're claiming.

"Unranked" is not having a rank position. For 2 candidates to both not have 
a rank position does not mean that they share a rank position. How could 
they when they don't have one?

Still, I'm going to ask Russ to add the clarifying definition, of voting X 
equal to Y.

Maybe I shouldn't call it a "supporting definition",  if that implies that 
it provides needed support.

Regarding these statements...

>Also, the statements in the commentary about "countering
>offensive order reversal" are completely irrelevant, since the need
>for defensive strategy is based on the opposing votes cast regardless
>of whether those votes are the result of offensive order reversal.
>
>I reply:
>
>It isn't quite clear why Richard thinks that the fact that the fact that 
>sincere votes can have the same effect as similarly voted strategic votes 
>means that it's irrelevant to speak of countering offensive order-reversal.
>
>Is it meaningless to speak of blocking an intentional punch because someone 
>could also hit you accidentally, and that would be blocked too, by the same 
>block?

You said:

To quote the web page once again:

"Compliance with SDSC means that a majority never needs any more than
truncation strategy to defeat a particular candidate, even when
countering offensive order reversal by that candidate's voters."

"Even when" is typically used in English as an indicator that there is
a potential (in this case, for the need to apply "more than truncation
strategy") that exists in the presence of the stated condition but not
in its absence. But that isn't true; that is what I was getting at.
The sentence retains its meaning without the misleading "even when"
clause.

I reply:

I don't know what that paragraph means, but this might help:

The website said:

"Compliance with SDSC means that a majority never needs any more than
truncation strategy to defeat a particular candidate, even when
countering offensive order reversal by that candidate's voters."

I comment:

With any pairwise-count method, a majority can need more drastic strategy to 
defeat a particular candidate under order-reversal conditions. With margins 
that  can require defensive order-reversal, for instance.  But we were 
saying that, even under those worst-case conditions, SDSC-complying methods 
still only need mere truncaton. Even then. That's why I said "even".

>Richard continued:
>
>FBC: For some set S of ballots, if R is the set of results that can
>occur when ballot B is added to S if candidate X is given the highest
>ranking on B, and R' is the set of results that can occur if ballot B
>is added to S when candidate X is not given the highest ranking on B,
>then either X is a member of R, or R' is a subset of R.
>
>I reply:
>
>I asked how a votes-only FBC equivalent could be written. Your criterion 
>may or may not be equivalent to FBC. From your other criteria in your 
>posting, I'd say the likelihood isn't promising.

It *is* FBC (with the necessary changes -- since as you pointed out
these criteria must apply to more than ranked methods -- from "is
given the highest ranking" to "is not voted lower than any other
candidate", and from "not given the highest ranking" to "is voted
lower than some other candidate". But don't take my word for it; study
it carefully and try to find some way in which it's not equivalent.

>In any case, FBC is written in a way that clearly, directly & obvioiusly 
>speaks to a voter concern.
>
>Why would anyone want to write it as Richard has written here (even if 
>Richard's criterion is equivalent to FBC)?

You said:

Promotion of FBC is
getting off of the topic

I reply:

You stated another wording. I said why I wouldn't adopt it for public use, 
even if it were equivalent to FBC.


You continued:

"By voting another candidate over candidate X, a voter
should never get a result that he could not get without doing so,
unless he could get X as the winner without doing so."

I reply:

My version says something that is easily recognized as meaning "No one ever 
has reason to bury hir favorite". I prefer that. Its importance is obvious.

If your wording turns out to mean the same thing, then maybe I'll use it 
when writing to people who like the kind of definitions that you like.

With any configuration of other people's votes where your voting someone 
over X could give a result you otherwise couldn't get, you have to be able 
to make X win without doing so.

As I said, if it turns out to be equivalent to FBC, then I might use it with 
people who don't like FBC's usual wording. But, equivalent or not, it 
doesn't sound at all compelling or obviously desirable.


I'd said:

>The above "FBC" wouldn't be publicly usable. If I tried, everyone would 
>tell me they have no idea what it's supposed to mean. And even for someone 
>who knows what it means, it doesn't speak directly, obviously and clearly 
>to voter concerns as my own version of FBC does.
>
>So, even if it should turn out that Richard's "FBC" is equivalent to FBC, I 
>wouldn't adopt it or replace FBC with it.

You replied:

A strange criticism, coming from the person who wrote just yesterday,
"And If FBC can be written votes-only, that would help its acceptance."

I reply:

When I said that a votes-only wording would help FBC's acceptance, I meant 
only that it would help FBC's overall acceptance by helping its acceptance 
with those who for some reason insist on votes-only definitions. I didn't 
mean that it would help FBC's acceptance with the general public. And you'd 
written something that is completely unusable with the public. That sure 
doesn't help acceptance with them.

But I repeat that if your "FBC" is really equivalent to FBC, then that could 
help FBC's overall acceptance, if it would make the criterion more popular 
with those who want things worded as you want things worded. That's what I 
meant when I said that it would help acceptance. But that doesn't mean that 
I would use that wording with anyone else.

Mike Ossipoff

_________________________________________________________________
Let the advanced features & services of MSN Internet Software maximize your 
online time. http://click.atdmt.com/AVE/go/onm00200363ave/direct/01/