[EM] BeatpathWinner doesn't fail Markus' "SDSC".

Markus Schulze markus.schulze at alumni.tu-berlin.de
Wed Feb 4 02:30:04 PST 2004


Dear Mike,

you wrote (4 Feb 2004):
> Not only does Plurality pass your "SDSC", but BeatpathWinner
> fails it:
>
> AB51, BC52, CA52
>
> B wins in BeatpathWinner, though more than half of the voters
> have ranked A over B.

The matrix of pairwise defeats looks as follows:

   A:B=103: 52
   A:C= 51:104
   B:C=103: 52

B and C are potential winners. The final winner depends on how
you solve indecisive situations.

If you mean Steve Eppley's "minimal defense" with "your 'SDSC'"
then your example doesn't demonstrate a violation of this
criterion since this majority of the voters doesn't rank
candidate B "no higher than tied for bottom".

Steve Eppley wrote (http://www.alumni.caltech.edu/~seppley):
> Any ordering of the alternatives must be an admissible vote,
> and if more than half of the voters rank y over x and x no
> higher than tied for bottom, then x must not be elected.

Markus Schulze



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