[EM] Re: "Implied ranked choice" method

[Eric Gorr]

At 10:58 PM +0000 8/31/04, Rob Brown wrote:
>Eric Gorr <eric <at> ericgorr.net> writes:
>
>>You are welcome to show that such a strategic advantage would exist
>>for MAM, using an example of a good Condorcet method.
>
>Not sure I understand you.  If there is not an advantage to ranking them
>explicitly, why would you want to do so?  On the one hand, you say you would
>demand it, but on the other hand, you seem to say there is no advantage to it?

It should be possible to develop two sets of related sets of ballots 
which have different Condorcet Winners.

In one set of ballots every voter provided their own unique ranking.

In the other set of ballots, every voter selected a proxy who has 
their own ranking of the candidates which most closely matched their 
ranking.

Which Condorcet Winner is the one that I believe is the most accurate 
result? The one in which every voter provided their own unique 
ranking.

(anyone care to provide the example?)