[EM] ironclad pro-Condorcet argument?

Dave Ketchum davek at clarityconnect.com
Mon Aug 23 21:38:45 PDT 2004

On Mon, 23 Aug 2004 11:29:48 -0700 Steve Eppley wrote:

> Hi,
> James G-A wrote:
>>Has anyone clearly advanced this pro-Condorcet argument? 
>>I think that it is devastating to methods which are not
>>Condorcet efficient. 
> -snip-
>>	If there is a Condorcet winner with regard to the
>>   sincere preference rankings of voters, and the voting
>>   method is plurality, then the Vote is only at
>>   equilibrium when the Condorcet winner is selected.
> -snip-
> Another positive argument for Condorcet-consistency 
> uses the single-elimination pairwise voting procedure 
> recommended by Robert's Rules, instead of plurality rule.  
> I presume the Robert's Rules procedure is used much more 
> than any other voting procedure, which, if true, lends 
> strength to the argument.  
> Most of the people reading this, I assume, are aware that 
> under the Robert's Rules procedure, the Condorcet winner 
> (when there is one) will be chosen, assuming either 
> that every voter votes sincerely or that every voter is 
> strategically sophisticated and knows the preferences 
> of all the voters.


The Robert's example is IRV.

One of IRV's problems is that it, too often, picks a winner different than 
Condorcet (even assuming there IS a Condorcet winner).

NOW, if the "assuming" that I read excludes the IRV problem cases, it 
seems misleading to me.

> --Steve

  davek at clarityconnect.com    people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
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