[EM] ironclad pro-Condorcet argument?

Steve Eppley seppley at alumni.caltech.edu
Mon Aug 23 11:29:48 PDT 2004

James G-A wrote:
> Has anyone clearly advanced this pro-Condorcet argument? 
> I think that it is devastating to methods which are not
> Condorcet efficient. 
> 	If there is a Condorcet winner with regard to the
>    sincere preference rankings of voters, and the voting
>    method is plurality, then the Vote is only at
>    equilibrium when the Condorcet winner is selected.

Another positive argument for Condorcet-consistency 
uses the single-elimination pairwise voting procedure 
recommended by Robert's Rules, instead of plurality rule.  
I presume the Robert's Rules procedure is used much more 
than any other voting procedure, which, if true, lends 
strength to the argument.  

Most of the people reading this, I assume, are aware that 
under the Robert's Rules procedure, the Condorcet winner 
(when there is one) will be chosen, assuming either 
that every voter votes sincerely or that every voter is 
strategically sophisticated and knows the preferences 
of all the voters.


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