[EM] ironclad pro-Condorcet argument?

Steve Eppley seppley at alumni.caltech.edu
Tue Aug 24 01:06:48 PDT 2004

Dave K wrote:
> On Mon, 23 Aug 2004 11:29:48 -0700 Steve Eppley wrote:
> > Another positive argument for Condorcet-consistency 
> > uses the single-elimination pairwise voting procedure 
> > recommended by Robert's Rules,
> > Most of the people reading this, I assume, are aware that 
> > under the Robert's Rules procedure, the Condorcet winner 
> > (when there is one) will be chosen, assuming either 
> > that every voter votes sincerely or that every voter is 
> > strategically sophisticated and knows the preferences 
> > of all the voters.
> HUH???  The Robert's example is IRV.

No, I wasn't referring to the Robert's Rules IRV example
of "preferential voting" that they reluctantly recommend 
when the members are scattered, as in a mail-in vote
(when better methods are impractical, or so they thought
when that section was written long ago).  I was referring 
to their main method, recommended for use when the 
members are assembled together and hence it's practical
to use a method that requires multiple rounds of voting.  
This method is sometimes called "agenda voting" and 
sometimes called "sequential pairwise voting."  It
doesn't ask the voters to express orders of preference.
And it's like a single-elimination tournament, not 
a round-robin tournament.  

Here's a simple example:  Someone proposes a bill and 
someone else proposes an amended version of the bill.  
In the first round of voting, those two alternatives 
would be pitted against each other.  The loser of 
that vote would be eliminated.  The winner of that 
vote would go on to the next round of voting, 
a vote between it and the status quo.


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