[EM] ironclad pro-Condorcet argument?

James Green-Armytage jarmyta at antioch-college.edu
Mon Aug 23 03:27:35 PDT 2004

>Sorry, I meant PR (Proportionnal represention)
	Oh, okay. Yeah, I was just talking about single-winner. PR is a totally
different problem.
>>I really don't think so. Please note that I'm only talking about
>>situations where there is a sincere Condorcet winner. If there is no
>>sincere CW, then I think that no equilibrium Votes will exist, as I
>>defined them in my last post. But when there is a sincere CW, then there
>>will be equilibrium Votes, and all of them will result in the election of
>>the CW.
>So we need another method for those cases ? or at least, we must agree 
>that there is no unique solution :-/
	Perhaps it's fair to say that there is no unique solution. For any
outcome, a relative majority will prefer a different outcome. That's not
to say that some outcomes cannot be deemed better than others, but it may
mean that a strategic equilibrium cannot be found. The method I have
proposed for resolving majority rule cycles is weighted pairwise.
	But I have not claimed that it can produce a full strategic equilibrium
in the case of a sincere cycle. I don't know if any method can, without it
being unfair in some way.

my best,

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