[EM] ironclad pro-Condorcet argument?

[James Green-Armytage]

>
>Sorry, I meant PR (Proportionnal represention)
>
	Oh, okay. Yeah, I was just talking about single-winner. PR is a totally
different problem.
>
>
>>I really don't think so. Please note that I'm only talking about
>>situations where there is a sincere Condorcet winner. If there is no
>>sincere CW, then I think that no equilibrium Votes will exist, as I
>>defined them in my last post. But when there is a sincere CW, then there
>>will be equilibrium Votes, and all of them will result in the election of
>>the CW.
>
>So we need another method for those cases ? or at least, we must agree 
>that there is no unique solution :-/
>
	Perhaps it's fair to say that there is no unique solution. For any
outcome, a relative majority will prefer a different outcome. That's not
to say that some outcomes cannot be deemed better than others, but it may
mean that a strategic equilibrium cannot be found. The method I have
proposed for resolving majority rule cycles is weighted pairwise.
http://fc.antioch.edu/~jarmyta@antioch-college.edu/voting_methods/weighted_pairwise.htm
	But I have not claimed that it can produce a full strategic equilibrium
in the case of a sincere cycle. I don't know if any method can, without it
being unfair in some way.

my best,
James