[EM] ironclad pro-Condorcet argument?

[Philippe Errembault]

You wrote:
>>> This suggests to me that the election of anyone other than the CW can be
>>> considered an ERROR on the part of the voters. 

I replied:
>>Except for PV methods !!!

> Sorry, but I just don't know what you're talking about here : (
> If you have a point of disagreement, would you mind explaining it in
> greater depth?

Sorry, I meant PR (Proportionnal represention)



>>By the way, Isn't this in contradictions with Arrow's impossibility
>>theorem ?

>I really don't think so. Please note that I'm only talking about
>situations where there is a sincere Condorcet winner. If there is no
>sincere CW, then I think that no equilibrium Votes will exist, as I
>defined them in my last post. But when there is a sincere CW, then there
>will be equilibrium Votes, and all of them will result in the election of
>the CW.

So we need another method for those cases ? or at least, we must agree 
that there is no unique solution :-/

>Arrow's theorem, I believe, only applies when majority rule cycles are
>possible.

I couldn't say because I haven't found the demonstration. (can't find where
they still have the book :-( If someone has it, I'd be glad if he sent it to me.)


> P.S. It's nice to hear from someone in Belgium.
:-)))

Philippe Errembault

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "James Green-Armytage" <jarmyta at antioch-college.edu>
To: "Philippe Errembault" <phil.errembault at skynet.be>; <election-methods-electorama.com at electorama.com>
Sent: Monday, August 23, 2004 11:31 AM
Subject: Re: [EM] ironclad pro-Condorcet argument?



I had written:
>> This suggests to me that the election of anyone other than the CW can be
>> considered an ERROR on the part of the voters. 

Philippe, you replied:
>Except for PV methods !!!

Sorry, but I just don't know what you're talking about here : (
If you have a point of disagreement, would you mind explaining it in
greater depth?
>
>By the way, Isn't this in contradictions with Arrow's impossibility
>theorem ?

I really don't think so. Please note that I'm only talking about
situations where there is a sincere Condorcet winner. If there is no
sincere CW, then I think that no equilibrium Votes will exist, as I
defined them in my last post. But when there is a sincere CW, then there
will be equilibrium Votes, and all of them will result in the election of
the CW.
>
Arrow's theorem, I believe, only applies when majority rule cycles are
possible.
>
my best,
James

P.S. It's nice to hear from someone in Belgium.

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