[EM] ironclad pro-Condorcet argument?
seppley at alumni.caltech.edu
Mon Aug 23 04:42:52 PDT 2004
James G-A wrote:
> Has anyone clearly advanced this pro-Condorcet argument?
> I think that it is devastating to methods which are not
> Condorcet efficient.
> If there is a Condorcet winner with regard to the
> sincere preference rankings of voters, and the voting
> method is plurality, then the Vote is only at
> equilibrium when the Condorcet winner is selected.
It's similar to the "arena voting" method I wrote
about a few years ago here in the em list, as a
thought experiment: All the voters are assembled
together in the morning in a (huge) arena, in which
each candidate has a banner planted. At the end
of the day, the winner is the candidate whose
banner has the most voters gathered 'round.
> This suggests to me that the election of anyone other
> than the CW can be considered an ERROR on the part of
> the voters. That is, if they had better information,
> and enough time to work it out, they would have settled
> on the CW...
Calling it an error seems an overstatement. Consider
2 candidates: A & B.
49% intensely prefer A.
51% slightly prefer B.
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