[EM] Re: Diana's Proposed method of cycle resolution:

[Kevin Venzke]

Donald,

 --- Donald Davison <donald at mich.com> a écrit : 
> Years ago, on this list, I suggested that when Condorcet shows a circular
> tie that the best thing to do was to eliminate one candidate.  Most likely
> this will break the cycle.  Then you can resume using Condorcet if you
> must.

You could do this with Raynaud or "Pairwise-Elimination," where you
successively eliminate the candidate who suffers the worst defeat.  It's
certainly more intuitive to delete candidates than contests.  It's not a
monotonic method, but neither is IRV.

I wonder whether most Condorcet advocates would accept a non-monotonic version
(thinking Raynaud and Nanson/Baldwin) if that option were much easier to get
adopted.

> Condorcet will use all the lower choices.  Irving will only use ten percent
> of the lower choices.  Using less is best.  A multi choice election that
> has a majority winner in the first choices is ideal because no lower
> choices will be used.  Think about that, if that is the ideal, then we
> should stay as close as possible to the ideal as we can when picking an
> election method.

Donald, Condorcet methods will always elect a candidate who is the first 
choice of a majority!

What is bad about heavy emphasis on first choices, is that it creates incentive
to lie about who is really your favorite.  Most of us here don't like order-
reversal incentive.


Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr


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