[EM] Condorcet completed by limited-rank Condorcet!
Forest Simmons
fsimmons at pcc.edu
Tue Sep 16 18:15:12 PDT 2003
These are the kinds of creative forays that I like to see. Keep it up long
enough and you're going to hit on the winning combination!
On Sun, 14 Sep 2003, Chris Benham wrote:
> 1.CR ballots, voters give each candidate a score out of 100 ( or any
> other round number that is much greater than the number of candidates.)
> 2. Inferring the rankings from the ratings, elect the CW is there is
> one. If not, then eliminate the non-members of the Smith set.
>
> 3.Those ballots which show as many preference-levels among the remaining
> candidates as there are remaining candidates (N) are now converted to
> ballots showing (N-1) preferences by disregarding the smallest gap in
> the scores of adjacently ranked remaining candidates. If there is a tie
> for "smallest gap" , then disregard the tied gap between the highest
> adjacent preferences among the remaining candidates.
>
> 4. Inferring rankings from these ballots (amended so that none show more
> than N-1 preference-levels), elect the CW if there is one. If not ,
> eliminate non-members of the Smith set, repeat step 3 and so on.
>
> An equivalent version which is easier to hand-count but less natural and
> more awkward to vote is to have the voters rank the candidates and also
> rank the the gaps in utility between the adjacently-ranked candidates,
> from largest to smallest.
>
> This is currently my favourite "high-resolution CR-ballot" single-winner
> method. I think it should comply with Participation, and
> probably have fewer and/or less serious strategy problems than plain
> ranked-ballot Condorcet.
>
> Chris Benham
>
>
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