[EM] Condorcet completed by limited-rank Condorcet!

Chris Benham chrisbenham at bigpond.com
Sat Sep 13 15:19:01 PDT 2003


1.CR  ballots, voters give each candidate a score out of  100 ( or any 
other round number that is much greater than the number of candidates.)
2. Inferring the rankings from the ratings, elect the CW is there is 
one.  If not, then eliminate the non-members of the Smith set.

3.Those ballots which show as many preference-levels among the remaining 
candidates as there are remaining candidates (N) are now converted to 
ballots showing (N-1) preferences by disregarding the smallest gap in 
the scores of adjacently ranked remaining candidates. If there is a tie 
for "smallest gap" , then disregard the tied gap between the highest 
adjacent preferences among the remaining candidates.

4. Inferring rankings from these ballots (amended so that none show more 
than N-1 preference-levels), elect the CW if there is one.  If not , 
eliminate non-members of the Smith set, repeat step 3 and so on.

An equivalent version which is easier to hand-count but less natural and 
more awkward to vote is to have the voters rank the candidates and also 
rank the the gaps in utility  between the adjacently-ranked candidates, 
from largest to smallest.

This is currently my favourite "high-resolution CR-ballot" single-winner 
method. I think it should comply with Participation, and
probably have fewer and/or less serious strategy problems than plain 
ranked-ballot Condorcet.

Chris Benham





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