[EM] Request for Ranked Pair strategy holes (margin, rm & wv)

[Adam Tarr]

49% A>B>C
12% B>A>C
12% B>C>A
27% C>B>A

The 49% can get A elected by truncating in margins.

In winning votes, the truncation has no effect.

-Adam

At 01:24 AM 9/10/2003 -0400, Stephane Rouillon wrote:

>In the past, several people sent me some examples where
>a week condorcet winner could get his victory stolen
>by some strategical truncation behavior...
>
>I was able to generate a family of problems to do so
>even with Ranked Pair (winning votes) at the time:
>
>11+2X votes:
>--------------
>2+X : A
>2 : A > B > C
>2 : B > A > C
>1+X : B > C > A
>4: C
>
>A is the Condorcet winner.
>The two B > A > C voters can get B elected by truncation, voting only B.
>
>Adam and Alex had the same kind of example, even more obvious for
>margin (and relative margin). Could anyone send me some again?
>
>Thanks,
>Stephane.
>
>----
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