[EM] IRV-Approval, Condorcet-Approval hybrids

[Dgamble997 at aol.com]

Kevin Venzke wrote:

>David's method gives me a similar, simpler idea that would seem to be an
>improvement over IRV. The method would be:

>1. The voters rank the candidates they would be willing to support, and also
>place an approval cutoff. (Alternatively, all candidates ranked non-last
>could be considered "approved.")
>2. While there is no (voted) majority favorite, eliminate the Approval 
loser.
>3. Elect the voted majority favorite.

I admit my method is complex -simpler would be better. Could you provide an 
example of your (or Chris's) idea to show how it would discriminate a low 
utility centrist from a high utility one?

How for example

45 A>B
8 B>A
7 B>C
40 C>B

elects B

but

45 A>>>>B
8 B>A
7 B>C
40 C>>>>B

elects A ?

I would be interested.
        

David Gamble
    
    

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