<HTML><FONT FACE=arial,helvetica><FONT SIZE=2 FAMILY="SANSSERIF" FACE="Arial" LANG="0">Kevin Venzke wrote:<BR>
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>David's method gives me a similar, simpler idea that would seem to be an<BR>
>improvement over IRV. The method would be:<BR>
<BR>
>1. The voters rank the candidates they would be willing to support, and also<BR>
>place an approval cutoff. (Alternatively, all candidates ranked non-last<BR>
>could be considered "approved.")<BR>
>2. While there is no (voted) majority favorite, eliminate the Approval loser.<BR>
>3. Elect the voted majority favorite.<BR>
<BR>
I admit my method is complex -simpler would be better. Could you provide an example of your (or Chris's) idea to show how it would discriminate a low utility centrist from a high utility one?<BR>
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How for example<BR>
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45 A>B<BR>
8 B>A<BR>
7 B>C<BR>
40 C>B<BR>
<BR>
elects B<BR>
<BR>
but<BR>
<BR>
45 A>>>>B<BR>
8 B>A<BR>
7 B>C<BR>
40 C>>>>B<BR>
<BR>
elects A ?<BR>
<BR>
I would be interested.<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
David Gamble<BR>
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