[EM] Another PR method based on ranked ballots

Stephane Rouillon stephane.rouillon at sympatico.ca
Tue Mar 25 18:13:13 PST 2003


I do not like super-majorities because the limit is artificial:
55%, 60%, 66%, 75%
it leads toward changing the rule to win...

I prefer two consecutive majority votes with an election between them.
This is how fundamental laws are changed for any assembly or union in Quebec.

Second if you can protect just enough any elected officials from the
consequences of being a dissident within its own party, you get check and
balance in a more efficient way, in one single chamber.
"just enough" so the dissident could get reelected if (s)he is right although
its party kicks the dissident out or assign the dissident to a suicide
constituency. That's why I think independant candidatures are mandatory
and the system should not contain any suicide-candidature, either geographic
as with small constituencies or by position on closed list.

It leads directly to STV-Droop.
Finally, if you just want to improve direct approbation rates,
proportionality,
simplicity and stability, minor additional changes to the mathematical
mechanics leads then to SPPA...

Steph

Alex Small a écrit :

> > One "intelligent and fair" chamber should be able
> > to pass only good laws without any strategical
> > additional component. The goal of a chamber is to
> > identify and respond to new problems by adapted new
> > laws. Not to maintain statu quo when some minority
> > (geographical or other) wants to preserve its advantage
> > at the expense of the new needs for the majority.
>
> And in principle a single ruler elected by a majority of the people should
> possess the wisdom and intelligence to make good decisions.  In principle
> the legislature should know better than to enact laws that violate the
> Constitutional liberties of the people, so judicial review should be
> unnecessary.
>
> In practice, this isn't the way it works out.  Checks and balances are
> necessary.
>
> On the positive side, if a problem is identified, usually both chambers
> agree that it needs to be solved.  In the US, both houses of Congress
> routinely put forward bill relating to health care, pollution, social
> security, national defense, privacy, etc.  Everybody agrees on what the
> problems are.  They often have different visions of how to solve it, and
> the fact that there are so many competing opinions on the major issues of
> the day means that we should take time before making laws.
>
> As for whether there should be a minority veto, I have to argue in favor
> of that for certain things.  While I don't like the notion of geographic
> minority vetos (it makes no sense that a person in California gets no
> minority veto while a person in Wyoming does), a supermajority requirement
> in a democratically apportioned legislature enables a minority veto where
> any person (or a representative thereof) can be part of that minority.  If
> everything required only a simple majority, including Constitutions, then
> the Constitution would lose all meaning.  Amending the Constitution would
> be as simple as making any other law, so there would be no meaningful
> limits on lawmakers.
>
> We might disagree over which particular matters should be subject to
> minority vetos, and what the supermajority threshold should be, but the
> notion that a simple majority should not suffice in all cases is a sound
> one.
>
> Alex
>
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