[EM] Another PR method based on ranked ballots

James Gilmour jgilmour at globalnet.co.uk
Sun Mar 23 17:12:03 PST 2003


Stephane wrote
> James Gilmour a écrit :
>
> > No.  The largest single defect of single-member districts is that they usually
> > deny representation to half of those who vote.  At best, they can guarantee
> > representation to only half.  The second largest defect of
> single-member districts
> > is that they commonly distort the wishes of the voters in terms of overall
> > representation.  Gerrymandering is a defect of single-member districts, but it
> > comes third on my list.
>
> SPPA (French acronym) solves both lattest problems (totally proportional and no
> circumscription).

I do not understand the term "circumscription".

> About the first problem, Montreal simulation done during the Convention
> of electors,
> november 10th, showed direct support using four different methods
> after rallying when it is used:

I do not understand what the term "rallying" means.

> FPTP (no rallying) 46%
> MMP (no rallying) 38% - but except to quota, proportional
> STV (after rallying) 46% - semi-proportional
> SPPA (after rallying) 69% - integer optimal proportional

What do you mean by "direct support"?  What are the percentages?

If the simulation of STV gave a result that can be correctly described as
"semi-propotional" then all I can say is that it was a simulation of a very poor
implementation of STV-PR.  Actual results from real STV-PR public elections show
that STV-PR can be correctly described as "proportional".  What is "optimal" will
depend on the criteria you have selected to optimise and the definitions you have
chosen to use.

>
> Just read and ask...
> http://www.fairvotecanada.org/phpBB/viewtopic.php?topic=8&forum=1&4

I have read through this description but cannot find the answers to the questions
above.

I am not in favour of any system that allocates seats to parties.  Political
parties already have too much power over the elected representatives.  The balance
of power needs to be redressed in favour of the voters.

The proportionality in your proportional representation is focussed exclusively on
the political parties.  But proportional representation can be, and in my view,
should be, about much more than just PR of political parties.

If I have understood your description correctly, when no party wins a majority of
seats, you allocate 50% of the seats to the party that wins most votes.  This may
or may not solve your problem of "shaky governments" by providing them with a
"crutch", but it is not proportional representation.  Practical experience of real
PR systems shows that neither coalition government nor minority government need be
shaky.  That is a function of the political culture, not the voting system.

You advocate a system of electoral "ridings" instead of geographically defined
electoral districts.  This would not be acceptable in the UK (and, I suspect, in
many other countries) where locality and geography are considered important in
representation at all levels of government.

Your example was for 10 "ridings" and 10 seats.  The UK Parliament has 659 elected
members.  Under your system would this mean there would be 659 electoral "ridings"
and that the votes would be averaged over all 659 ridings to ensure a high degree
of party proportionality?  If you do mean PR to one in 659 (1/659th), I have to
say that this is not necessary and that it is highly undesirable.  Its political
consequences would be disastrous.  That is not speculation on my part - sadly, we
have the we have the evidence from real elections of national legislatures to
confirm the point.

James




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