[EM] Approval-Condorcet hybrid encouraging truncation

[Craig Carey]

You wrote that MAM is similar to MIKE OSSIPOFF's SDSC.

I now request the proof of that.

Here is the definition of MIKE OSSIPOFF, who thinks like you since one of
his rules is similar:

   http://www.electionmethods.org/evaluation.html

__________________________________________________________________________

 >Strong Defensive Strategy Criterion (SDSC)
 >Statement of Criterion
 >
 >If a majority prefers one particular candidate to another, then they
 >should have a way of voting that will ensure that the other cannot win,
 >without any member of that majority reversing a preference for one
 >candidate over another or falsely voting two candidates equal.
__________________________________________________________________________


That is obviously a very very very stupid definition. Fortunately MIKE
OSSIPOFF has not yet written in telling us that he will not clarify it
or reword it.

(All elections V)
(Suppose V has non-negative papers for simplicity) implies
(All sets of weighted papers P)
(All kinds of papers in P are in V and the weight of each element of p is
  not greater than the corresponding component in V) implies
(the sum of the weights of p is over 1/2 of the total weight of V) implies
(All candidate c)
(Candidate c is in the set of weighted papers, P) implies
(All candidates d)
(Candidate d is in the election, V) implies
(There Exists election X) and
(not (d in Winners(X)) and % "ensure that the other cannot win"
not [                      % "without"
[ (Exists a weighted paper q)(q in P, and q has a not-greater weight than
   the corresponding paper in P)    % member of the majority"
   (Exists two candidates t1, t2)   % "one candidate [and] another"
   (Exists a weighted paper r)(r in X, and r has a not-greater weight than
   the corresponding paper in X)    % "over another"
   Preferences_For_Candidate_t1_and_t2_Are_Reversed_In_Papers (t1, t2; q, r)
.OR.
  (Some OSSIPOFF  NONSENSE TERM ON "false voting": can't fill it in) ]]

Using the word "without" is failrly hostile.
What a large number of "For All"s. He defines a lot of variables and
does not constrain them properly and so I presume every preferential
voting method would fail the test. But MIKE can't seem to get his thinking
checked against one candidate elections.  A person that incompetent should
be briefer.

There seems to no requirement that when switching the ordering of a
preference ("reversing a preference"), that this is ruled out:
  * Some 50,000,000 other ballot papers are added into the 2nd case.


In Feb-Mar 2000, Mr Ossipoff wanted to allow that sort of thing for his
FBC.

Also the rule seems a overly complex given how pathetic it is.

That is the essential MIKE OSSIPOFF : ONE CANDIDATE FPTP IS FAILED.

He has put the nonsense behind a "not" (i.e. the "without"). That man
is not entirely clueless since now he could come in make an argument
defending SDSC.

The SDSC rule fails all preferential voting methods that solve the
1 candidate 1 winner election, by selecting the only candidate. However
getting a coherent adimission from MIKE OSSIPOFF could unachievable,

-----------------


A dumb idea of OSSIPOFF's SDSC is this:

  * IF in case 1, the majority votes (..A..B..), and then

  * if in case 2, they vote (...B..A..)

then MIKE requires this:

  * the preferential voting method is NOT failed just for having A win in
     case 1, and
  * the preferential voting methods IS FAILED for having B win the case 2
     election.


-----------------

The webpage provides this false comment:

 >The Condorcet method complies with the Strong Defensive Strategy
 >Criterion, but none of the other methods in the compliance table above
 >comply.

The webmaster -- Piaelli -- shows up. It is quite unimpressive when
that happens. I doubt he has even a tiny interest in preferential voting.

_______________________________________________________________________

 >If you have any quesions, comments, or suggestions, please contact us
 >(remove the "junk" from the second address).
_______________________________________________________________________







At 03\03\11 17:48 -0800 Tuesday, Steve Eppley wrote:
 >On 12 Mar 2003 at 0:33, Kevin Venzke wrote:
...
 >I believe so, but I prefer proofs over intuition.  Sometimes my
 >intuition is wrong, as when I mistakenly believed that MAM and
 >BeatpathWinner satisfy Independence from Pareto-dominated
 >Alternatives.
...

Maybe it is because you don't use algebra that considers flats instead
of numbers ?.


 >
 >MAM is the best method, of course.  :-)
 >

That would easily be false too then, judging by the rest of your message.


 >MAM satisfies Minimal Defense (and Mike Ossipoff's similar SDSC) so
 >it provides a second line of defense when Sincere Defense doesn't


Lines of defence ... against what?: allegations that you have totally
worthless rules  ?.



 >have bite due to some of the majority failing to rank the compromise
 >over the dividing line over the greater evil. (The underlying goal is
 >to minimize the coordination costs for a "good" majority to be able
 >to ensure the defeat of "evil" candidates.  The assumption is that
 >sincere ordering is cheapest, downranking evil candidates is next
 >cheapest, ranking compromises equal to favorites is next, and ranking
 >compromises over favorites is most expensive to coordinate.)


Itemizing that:

 >The underlying goal is to minimize the coordination costs for a "good"
 > majority to be able to ensure the defeat of "evil" candidates.

 >The assumption is that sincere ordering is cheapest,
 > downranking evil candidates is next cheapest,
 > ranking compromises equal to favorites is next,
 > and ranking compromises over favorites is most expensive to coordinate.


Ranking compromises over favorites ??.
That sounds like OSSIPOFF's SDSC in that when the two cases are symmetric
over which is preferred: B or A, the rule does not look right.

What is a "compromise"?. To keep it brief so that readers have a minimal
of mistakes to study, only post up a quantifier logic formulation.

Oh, you reject the axioms of fairness too, I much presume. In the
circumstances, I hope you have no complaints about my message.



Craig Carey