[EM] Approval-Condorcet hybrid encouraging truncation

[Kevin Venzke]

 --- Steve Eppley <seppley at alumni.caltech.edu> a
écrit : 
> Clearly B is the "approval" winner, if you interpret
> being ranked 
> over the line as being "approved." (An
> interpretation I think should 
> be avoided, since "approval" is a misleading
> absolutist concept and 
> *relative* preferences are what really matter. 

I can appreciate that, but if the divider has no
meaning except for its practical/strategic use, I
wonder how to explain to people the purpose of the
divider.

> > I think this is intuitive.  Isn't it just a
> > consequence of it being impossible to have a cycle
> > with an approval ballot?
> 
> I believe so, but I prefer proofs over intuition.

Well, I'll trust you.
 
> > > I'm concerned that some voters wouldn't use the 
> > > dividing line strategically as intended
> >
> > I also think my method could alleviate some of
> your
> > concern about the voters using the divider
> > efficiently.  
> 
> I didn't use the word "efficiently" and am uncertain
> what Kevin means 
> by that here.  

By "efficiently" I meant "strategically as intended."

> That doesn't alleviate my concern.  I want them to
> rank some 
> "compromise" candidate(s) over the line (at least in
> the scenarios 
> where no candidate is the top choice of a majority)
> and neither your 
> method nor the family I described force them to do
> so.  For example, 
> some Nader voters might rank only Nader over the
> line.

Right; I want them to rank "compromise" candidates
over the line, too.  My suspicion is that they'll be
more inclined to do so if not ranking a candidate
above the line means ranking him equally with everyone
else below the line.

> 
> I think the voter should also be allowed to order
> the candidates 
> below the line, so we can use those preferences to
> help find the best 
> compromise.

Yes, I think it would be nice (ordering below the
line), but if it messes up the voters' use of the
divider line, perhaps it can be sacrificed.

>(The
> underlying goal is 
> to minimize the coordination costs for a "good"
> majority to be able 
> to ensure the defeat of "evil" candidates.  The
> assumption is that 
> sincere ordering is cheapest, downranking evil
> candidates is next 
> cheapest, ranking compromises equal to favorites is
> next, and ranking 
> compromises over favorites is most expensive to
> coordinate.)

I will think about this.  (I hadn't thought of it in
that way.)

> >Do you think tinkering with the ballot > format is
> >completely out? 
> 
> I can't begin to answer that last question until
> Kevin indicates 
> which ballot formats he considers "untinkered."  

I meant tinkered, altered, from what you specified in
rule #1 of your method family.  Thus my method's
ballot is "tinkered" in this context.

Yours

Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr

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