[EM] Re: MC -1,0,1 ---- IRV hybrid (slightly ammended)

Chris Benham chrisbenham at bigpond.com
Sat Mar 8 05:22:01 PST 2003


I understand that for purely strategic voters with clear preferences, 
 -1,0, 1 is equivalent to Approval.
I  accept that the idea of  limiting  Dissapprovals is a mistake, but 
the example given by  Kevin Venzke of  a  2-candidate race being 
expanded to a 3-candidate race by the nomination of  one of the first 
two's sister was not in my opinion good, (assuming the sister only takes 
votes from her brother) because any candidate with sufficient proportion 
of the votes to win a 2 -horse race will always win anyway. (BTW, I had 
noeone else's ideas in mind when I wrote "and not as joke". Maybe I 
meant "not as a good joke".)
So here in a (hopefully) more succinct form is the ammended version.
 Voters number candidates in order of preference  and also mark however 
many they like as  Approved or  Dissaproved . (There can be a little 
note on the ballot paper advising voters that handing out Dissaprovals 
increases the effect of their Approvals, and vice versa).  If  a 
candidate gets a majority of  number 1s,  he/she wins.  Failing that, if 
 one and only one candidate gets a majority of  Approvals, he/she wins.
If  more than one candidate gets a majority of Approvals, the rest are 
eliminated and their preferences are transfered. If that gives a 
candidate a majority, then he/she wins. If not the winner shall be the 
remaining candidate with the highest  Approvals minus Disapprovals score.
 If  no candidate is Approved by the majority, and if there is one and 
only one candidate not Disapproved by the majority, then he/she wins. If 
more than one candidate is not Disapproved by the majority, the the rest 
are eliminated and their preferences transfered and so on as before.If 
that gives a candidate a majority, he/she wins.If not the winner shall 
be the candidate with the highest Approvals minus Dissapprovals score.
  If  all candidates are Disapproved by the majority, then the winner 
shall be the candidate with  the highest Approvals minus Disapprovals 
score (unless you have a rule which states that in that case  noone is 
elected).
Of course you could have a simpler version without the Disapprovals . 
Part of the idea is that I think that should be no need for any voter to 
strategise with his numbered rankings. It is highly likely if not 
certain it will elect a member of the Smith set, and of course it 
complies strictly with "Majority Favourite".
Thanks for taking some interest,
Chris Benham




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