Wrong claim that FBC checks a method (Re: [EM] MinMax variant

[Craig Carey]

At 03\03\07 10:42 -0800 Friday, Forest Simmons wrote:
 >Has anybody ever proposed minimizing the maximum opposition rather than
 >minimizing the maximum defeat?
 >
 >I know that theoretically this could elect the Condorcet Loser, but it
 >seems very unlikely that it would do so.
 >
 >It seems to me that if equality were allowed in the rankings, then this
 >method would satisfy the FBC, since ranking Favorite equal with Compromise
 >wouldn't increase opposition against Compromise.
...

It is fairly obvious that there is no FBC rule.
If you were any good at topic of preferential voting then you would have
converted FBC into an algebraic quantifier logic formulation.

How is FBC defined now but you failed to get the definition out in this
message:

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/message/8037

 >From:  Forest Simmons <fsimmons at p...>
 >Date:  Thu Sep 6, 2001  2:13 am
 >Subject:  Re: [EM] FBC (Favorite Betrayal Criterion) Definition
 >
 >My try at formalizing the definition of FBC didn't quite capture the
 >concept.
 >
 >Here's a corrected version:
 >
 >As before W(C,S,M) is True if and only if candidate C wins when the set S
 >of ballots is processed by method M.
 >

Given that you didn't test a method with the rule, and also did
not define a replacement FBC rule, then perhaps you would stop suggesting
that it seems the FBC is defined.

One of the first things to ask: was there any intent to have FBC
test a preferential voting method like the Alternative Vote.

MR OSSIPOFF (was Otisoff until the unexplained name change [any comments
MIKE ?]) has failed to povide a definition of the word "over" in FBC
that is precise over these ideas:

   (1) there are two uses of "over" for the two cases;
   (2) what power does an "over" word have to stop other ballot checkboxes
        from being altered ?
   (3) FBC and its overs it seems to be so stupid that it is true that
        "over" is perfectly undefined for STV style ballot papers when
         the last checkbox is not filled in.

MIKE and Mr FOREST SIMMONS obstruct inquiries.

A consequence of their thinking is wide river of lies on FBC.

The Americans have been so dominant with wrong thinking that about
11 30-message pages show up on FBC at the Yahoogroups website when a
search is done:

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/messagesearch/5656?query=FBC

A river of lying about FBC.

A thread titled 'lying about FBC' gets washed into the history of the
archives without members spotting the issue.



http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/message/5060 :

At 2000-Feb-28 16:17 +0000 Monday, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:

    X-Originating-IP: [204.120.48.3]
    From: "MIKE OSSIPOFF" <nkklrp at hotmail.com>
    To: election-methods-list at eskimo.com
    Subject: Re: Approval
    Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2000 16:17:38 GMT
 >
 >
 >
 >>Are people writing to this list advocating some "Approval Vote" method?.
 >
 >Yes. But it it isn't a question of some Approval method; there's
 >one method called Approval: Same as Plurality except that each
 >voter may give one vote each to any candidate(s). As with
 >Plurality, the candidate with the most votes wins.
 >
 >>Isn't it one of the very worst methods around?.
 >
 >No.
...
 >
 >If a majority of all the voters prefer A to B, then they should
 >have a way of voting that will ensure that B can't win, without
 >any member of that majority voting a less-liked candidate over
 >a more-liked candidate.
 >

That wording "should have a way", is definitely avoided when there
is an aim to reject the Alternative Vote for expecting insincerity.

...
 >***
 >
 >These 2 criteria are met by Approval, and by no other method:

A false claim about FBC occurred before the first definition, just
by a paragraph. (That statement looks like it should be true or
false, and after 3 years, MIKE only settled upon the idea of not
answering questions, and topic of FBC being worth considering
passed away before us. Had is lasted longer...

 >
 >Favorite-Betrayal Criterion (FBC):
 >
 >By voting a less-liked candidate over his favorite, a voter should
 >never gain an outcome that he likes better than any outcome that
 >he could get without voting a less-liked candidate over his
 >favorite.
 >


//////////////




At 2000\03\01 22:53 +0000 Wednesday, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:

    http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/message/5073

    X-Originating-IP: [204.120.48.3]
    From: "MIKE OSSIPOFF" <nkklrp at hotmail.com>
    To: election-methods-list at eskimo.com
    Subject: Re: Approval
    Date: Wed, 01 Mar 2000 22:53:26 GMT
...
 >>
 >>Power
 >>  +
 >>  +                             +     +     +
 >>  +                       +                       +
 >>  +                 +
 >>  +           +
 >>  +     +
 >>  +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+---->
 >>  0     1     2     3     4     5     6     7  Number of Votes
 >
...
 >To maximize your chance of changing the election outcome, you'd
 >vote for half of the candidates. But voters have a different goal.
 >They want to maximize their utility expectation. Their strategy


That becomes an obvious falsehood. That is some ultra-linear theory
that voters should have no especial regard for. It is too stupid
to pause over, though it could look better if the method is nothing
other than some checkbox method.


 >So I assure you that voters needn't worry about that graph
 >that you posted. Their strategy is quite similar to the one
 >that they use in FPTP, but I'll get to that later.
 >
 >>
 >>It is not a method that tries particularly hard to elect their
 >>  first preference.
 >
 >Sure it is
...
 >You later say that Approval is worse than FPTP. No way. Approval
 >is simply FPTP, with more voter freedom added. More freedom isn't
 >a bad thing. FPTP only allows you to vote for one. With Approval
 >you can vote for only one if you choose to, or you can vote for
 >as many or as few as you choose to.
...

 >> >Favorite-Betrayal Criterion (FBC):
 >> >
 >> >By voting a less-liked candidate over his favorite, a voter should
 >> >never gain an outcome that he likes better than any outcome that
 >> >he could get without voting a less-liked candidate over his
 >> >favorite.
 >> >
...
 >The words "over his favorite" doesn't mean that the number of votes
 >remains constant. It changes during the voting, as more people
 >arrive at the polls. However, after the polling is over, then
 >the number of votes does remain constant, as it would with any
 >method.
...
 >
 >In any method you can vote A over B by voting for A & not for
 >B (If it's a rank method, of course that means you rank A but
 >not B). In a rank method you can also do it by ranking A higher
 >than B. That's what I mean by "over his favorite".
 >
...
 >>How has the Approval Voting method evolved over the last decade
 >>  or years?.
 >
 >Why should it evolve?

If Americans don't understand that then they could be stupid.

 From the initial start of producing a fake junk crap test that
would pass only the Approval Vote, Mr OSSIPOFF vanished into
years of asserting here that the original purpose could not be
strengthened, since others should already know what the rule
means.

Prior to Feb 2000, the mailing list did not know about FBC.
By the first week of March 2000, it was under heavy criticism.

FOREST SIMMONS tried to replace it and assumed it got STV style
ballot papers. He might have sought to replace monotonicity.
I don't recall that being said. The attempt failed.

As for minimax, it sounds incredibly unpromising. However it is
an American method. I.e. reasoning for why it is perfect would
be unavailable.

----

So the word "over" requires that both preferences do not show
on the paper at the same time.

That would be why MIKE OSSIPOFF was refusing from the very
first moments, to define the word "over".

That simple outflowing of thoughts of Mr Blake Cretney on
majority or MMC seemed to be likely to lead to nothing.

It got us MMC: a rule that loses out in a scrap to the death,
with another axioms. Despite that, Mr Cretney tried to present
the rule with some show of reluctance while suggesting that
it is a good idea. If the word "rule" is replaced with "dog"
and it is dead due to a fight, then it may be time to get
another one. But the technique was evident: the death of the
rule/dog was not going to be mentioned here. So ambassadorial,

MMC is not good enough to be an axioms since it contradicts
the right number of winners axiom. Blake Cretney didn't
mention that.

This mailing list seems to have less than 1/50-th of the
competence in the topic of preferential voting them my
own preferential voting mailing list.




Craig Carey
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/politicians-and-polytopes