[EM] IRV fails Later-No-Harm
nkklrp at hotmail.com
Tue Dec 23 17:53:02 PST 2003
Chris Benham wrote:
"Later-no-harm: Adding a later preference to a ballot should not harm
any candidate already listed".
In other words, if a method meets Later-no-harm then voters can never
get an advantage by truncating.
It is met by IRV, but is incompatible with Condorcet.
I got this from what I found to be the very interesting and illuminating
paper "Monotonicity and Single-Seat Election
Rules" by Woodall, and uploaded by Marcus Schulze:
Professor Steven Brams published an example in which IRV fails
No-Later-Harm. I'd post the example, but I don't know where to look for it.
You could find it just as well as I could.
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