[EM] serious strategy problem in Condorcet but not in IRV?

Eric Gorr eric at ericgorr.net
Thu Aug 21 14:00:03 PDT 2003


At 3:51 PM -0400 8/21/03, James Green-Armytage wrote:
>	What I am hoping is that maybe candidates and parties in the position
>that A and B are in will be moved to broker some sort of truce agreement
>whereby neither party instructs their supporters to use a burying /
>offensive order reversal strategy against the other party.

Why would there even be a truce?

It seems to me that in order for a manipulation strategy to succeed, 
accurate information is required.

So, I would like to ask a rather basic question...

Where will this information come from?

Polls are most often suggested as such a source....however, it would 
seem to me that one of the first things to happen would be for the 
intelligent leaders to tell everyone else to only provide bogus 
information to the poll takers, making any such strategic decisions 
impossible.

>I think that this is the
>point on which Condorcet is most vulnerable, and it would help Condorcet
>advocates sharp if they came up against the strongest available arguments
>on the subject. I am basically a Condorcet advocate myself, so it is not
>especially easy for me to be the one pressing for a harsh look at
>strategic incentives under Condorcet...

I am not yet convinced that this line of thought has any real merit 
beyond the purely academic.




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