[EM] Query for Approval advocates

Dave Ketchum davek at clarityconnect.com
Thu Aug 21 13:39:02 PDT 2003


On Wed, 20 Aug 2003 23:49:01 -0700 Bart Ingles wrote:

> Why should it be considered important to find a majority when none
> exists?  In my view, the very concept of 'majority' is meaningless when
> there are three or more candidates, and appears to be based on several
> logical fallacies including:
> 
> (1) Round number fallacy:  The 50% figure is viewed as magical because
> it has the appearance of being a "natural" threshold.  Which it is--if
> there are only two candidates.


It is a convenient threshold even with more candidates.  If Joe gets over 
50% in a Plurality election, then most of the voters would rather have Joe 
than would rather have any combination of the other candidates.

     Majority tells us little in an Approval election.  There could be TWO 

candidates, each marked acceptable by about 60% of the voters - we have to 

look farther as to whether Sam was liked better than Sue.
> 
> (2) Circular reasoning:  Majority proponents generally have a particular
> method in mind for arriving at a "majority".  This method is favored
> because it produces a majority, but the majority is defined in terms of
> the method.


This is a bigger deal, and IRV is the biggest sinner I notice at the moment.

Use of "majority" should be restricted to having over 50%, and require 
qualification if what is being considered is other than the obvious whole.

> 
> (3) Equivocation:  The majority produced by a particular method is often
> touted as though it were equivalent to an outright majority of
> first-choice votes.  But it would be easy to make a case that a
> candidate with a 49% plurality (or 45% or even 40%) really enjoys more
> public support in a 3-way race than someone with only 26% of
> first-choice votes and a similar number of 2nd-choice votes.  In fact,
> don't some New York City elections require only a 40% plurality to avoid
> a runoff?  This probably improves utility, if not Condorcet efficiency,
> while reducing cost.


Getting picky, we do not know for sure about "public support" from ballot 
counts.  It could be that, by election time, there is no support for any 
and the voters are simply voting against the rottenest lemons.  This is an 
argument for NOTA, to give the voters an escape from lousy selections of 
candidates.

Setting the decision point at 40% is deciding whether a runoff for 
Plurality will likely improve the result enough to be worth the pain:
      If Sam got 45% in Plurality, he would likely win a runoff.
      If Sam and Sue were near a tie in the 30s, makes sense for those who 
voted for others to get in on deciding between them.
      The French recently reminded us that, while a runoff between the top 
two is easiest to arrange, that will not necessarily please the voters.

> 
> To be sure, it's nice when a clear winner emerges who has the support of
> more voters than all other candidates combined, but I wouldn't attempt
> to mandate this any more than I would attempt to mandate unanimity.
> 
> Plurality in some form is the only thing that makes sense, albeit a
> plurality which is not split by votes given to competing candidates.
> 
I had to read this twice to stop choking - "plurality" reads best here as 
a numerical word rather than an election method.

It often needs qualification, as in the above 40%.

> Bart
> 
> 
> "John B. Hodges" wrote:
> 
>>[...] The question
>>I have is this: what if you STILL don't get a majority? For example,
>>what if there are many, many candidates, the electorate is pretty
>>close to evenly split, and everyone bullet-votes for their favorite?
>>I know it's a hard case; if everyone bullet-votes, all election
>>systems reduce to Plurality. But how, specifically, does MCA handle
>>the mechanics of it? Has anyone written a formal description of MCA?
>>

Most methods permit bullet voting, for those who can say all they wish
to say this way.  The better methods let those voters who choose,
express their desires in more detail.
-- 
davek at clarityconnect.com  http://www.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
            Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
                  If you want peace, work for justice.




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