[EM] Optimización Electoral [Ecuador gov elections office

Craig Carey research at ijs.co.nz
Wed Aug 20 00:09:03 PDT 2003


At 2003-08-19 15:29 -0400 Tuesday, James Green-Armytage wrote:
>>¿Cómo disminuir la desproporcionalidad electoral en un sistema de reparto
>>proporcional?.
>> 
>>Se convierte en un problema de programación lineal entera, minimizando un
>>índice, en particular el índice de mínimos cuadrdo de Gallagher que tiene
>>virtudes ya que ocupa una función trascendente que es la raíz cuadrada.
>> 
>>¿Que otras variables se podrían sugerir para la elaboración de un nuevo
>>método de reparo proporcional, además del número de votos?. ¿Podría ser
>>determinar una barrera electoral que dependa del número de
>>electores?..................
>
>Estoy apesadumbrado, yo no entiendo de lo que usted está hablando.  ¿Está
>esto en referencia a una discusión anterior?
>
>¿Sería posible traducir sus mensajes a inglés?  Estoy traduciendo
>actualmente este mensaje del inglés a Google que usa español, pues no
>hablo español. Quizás usted podría intentar este Web site:
>[http://www.google.com/language_tools?hl=es], o
>[http://www.google.com/language_tools?hl=en]. Miro adelante a oír de usted.

To Mr James Green-Armytage. Did you get the message properly translated there?.
I guess it counts for little if the "group mind" missed out.

Here is a translation of Mr G.A.'s text:

| I am grieved, I do not understand of which you are speaking. Is this in
| reference to a previous discussion? Would be possible to translate its
| messages to English? I am translating at the moment this message of the
| English to Google that Spanish uses, because I do not speak Spanish. Perhaps
| you could try this Web site:

Some an indication that there is a definite purpose backing up the
questions (or hints) might be needed. Otherwise it might be best to have
the topic change. E.g. Is it possible to send e-mail off to Ecuador and
thereby produce significant changes in how the central government elects
its politicians ?.

--

Ecuador elections office: http://www.tse.gov.ec/

   "Electoral Supreme Court ... is the maximum Electoral Organism with
   jurisdiction in all the National Territory.  Its mission is the one to
   organize, to direct, to watch and to guarantee the electoral process in
   agreement with the effective Law of Elections in Ecuador.

It is a website powered with Macromedia flash.

I am sure the question is probably going nowhere. Inside of the topic of
preferential voting, a method should be correct if only 5 voters.
Winners are not affected by square roots computations.

---

If it is on political topics, e.g. top up lists, then maybe this list might
be of interest:

   http://www.fairvotecanada.org/phpBB/

The site has a message-board message on how Turkey partly grasped at the
core IRV idea: getting the winners wrong through a unfairness instead of
clean bias in the presence of fairness. As a result, the 10% threshold that
was designed to keep Kurds lacking a political say, concluded by much
helping an Islamic political party. Maybe the Kurds didn't want to be IRVized
but the European Community Can be misled.

Mathematical-quality research into preferential voting:
    http://groups.yahoo.com/group/politicians-and-polytopes


PS. The Voting Matters publication has shifted away from the
   http://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/ers/mcd.htm (and the
   technical publications sub-website)
over to
   http://www.mcdougall.org.uk/index.html

The effect or change, that that would have, is not known by me at this
time.

-----------------

For all the EM researchers researching into the final last hurdle that the
Alternative Vote method must past if it is to be good, I announce a
   "For Loops" program
that allows navigating through (integral/discrete) paper weights ands and
counts.
Using that I was able to show that the Alternative Vote is about twice as
unfair or 2.3 times as unfair or so, than the quite unsatisfactory
method that eliminates all candidates except the FPTP-wise best 3.
Then the method uses a 1/3 quota to eliminate the remaining candidates.
Then 1 winner is found.








Craig Carey <research at ijs.co.nz>    Auckland, New Zealand
Ombudsman 1996 Fairness checklist: http://www.ijs.co.nz/fairness-standards.htm





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