[EM] serious strategy problem in Condorcet, but not in IRV?

[James Green-Armytage]

Dave, you write

>Just looking at the first example:
>      It starts with 44: B>A - they consider A to be better than C, and A 
>wins - GREAT!
>      Then they switch to 44: B>C - they claim to prefer C over A, and C 
>wins - ALSO GREAT!

No, when they switch to B>C, B wins, not C, although C might win
eventually if the A voters respond in kind.
>
>
>     What is NOT GREAT is the propaganda claim that it is unfair for the 
>voting method to honor their votes just because the propagandist asserts 
>that their claim to prefer C was insincere.

What do you mean, propaganda claim? I'm telling you straight out that
their votes *are* insincere. I gave the sincere preference rankings at the
beginning, and those don't change. They change their votes because it
benefits B, their sincere first choice. I agree that if they were being
sincere there wouldn't be a problem.

These are my imaginary voters, I made them up, and so I will tell you when
they are being sincere or not. : )

James