[EM] Re: Issues, Condorcet, and IRV (was: IRV vs. plurality)

[Eric Gorr]

>Dear Eric,
>
>you wrote (9 Aug 2003):
>>  Here is that example again (in a form so it can be easily fed into my site):
>>
>>  4:A>B>C>D>E>F
>>  2:A>B>F>D>E>C
>>  4:A>E>B>F>C>D
>>  2:A>E>F>B>C>D
>>  2:B>F>A>C>D>E
>>  2:C>D>B>E>F>A
>>  4:C>D>B>F>E>A
>>  12:D>E>C>A>B>F
>>  8:E>C>D>B>F>A
>>  10:F>A>B>C>D>E
>>  6:F>A>B>D>E>C
>>  4:F>E>D>B>C>A
>>  3:A>E>F>C>B>D     - the extra three votes
>>
>>  According to my site, there is a tie between A & D with or without
>>  those extra three votes added. The reason is that when I consider the
>>  victories that form the minor cycles, those victories get rejected
>>  because they form cycles.
>>
>>  This clearly seems to be the right thing to do in this case as the
>>  voters have provided no clear information on how they feel between A
>>  & D.
>
>Which election method did you use so that you got a tie between A and D?

http://www.ericgorr.net/condorcet

This is what Mike O. was calling Ranked Pairs Condorcet (Deterministic #1).

I verified that we were computing the same matrix and then worked out 
the results by hand as well.