[EM] Re: Issues, Condorcet, and IRV (was: IRV vs. plurality)

[Markus Schulze]

Dear Eric,

you wrote (9 Aug 2003):
> Here is that example again (in a form so it can be easily fed into my site):
>
> 4:A>B>C>D>E>F
> 2:A>B>F>D>E>C
> 4:A>E>B>F>C>D
> 2:A>E>F>B>C>D
> 2:B>F>A>C>D>E
> 2:C>D>B>E>F>A
> 4:C>D>B>F>E>A
> 12:D>E>C>A>B>F
> 8:E>C>D>B>F>A
> 10:F>A>B>C>D>E
> 6:F>A>B>D>E>C
> 4:F>E>D>B>C>A
> 3:A>E>F>C>B>D     - the extra three votes
>
> According to my site, there is a tie between A & D with or without
> those extra three votes added. The reason is that when I consider the
> victories that form the minor cycles, those victories get rejected
> because they form cycles.
>
> This clearly seems to be the right thing to do in this case as the
> voters have provided no clear information on how they feel between A
> & D.

Which election method did you use so that you got a tie between A and D?

Markus Schulze