[EM] Arrow's Theorem - The Return (again)

Stephane Rouillon stephane.rouillon at sympatico.ca
Mon Aug 4 11:15:02 PDT 2003


By your definition forcing every voter to put
A=B=....=H=I would be a "ranked electoral method".

IMHO, it is not
For all x and y, either  x R y  or  y R x
you want, it is
For all x and y, ALL  x R y  or  y R x  ARE EXPRESSABLE...

Sorry, I'm still with Alex for now.

Eric Gorr wrote :

> A
> At 9:23 AM -0400 8/4/03, Stephane Rouillon wrote:
> >Alex Small a écrit :
> >
> >>  Can I please get some back-up here?  Somebody, anybody, please back me up
> >>  on this?  I can't believe how difficult it is to drive home the point that
> >  > Approval Voting is not a ranked method.
> >>
>
> >Approval is not a ranked method.
> >It allows to represent preferential ballots that contain only one
> >preference symbol: (A=B=C=...=D) > (E=F=G...=H)
> >So Approval allows to represent equal rankings, but it
> >does not allow to represent ballots containing many
> >preference symbols (>).
>
> Approval is a ranked method by Arrow's Axioms
> which only requires voters express their opinion
> on the comparison between candidates through the
> following relation:
>
>    For all x and y, either x R y or y R x
>
> Now, since R can be either '=' or '>', Approval
> does not violate this. At best, it could probably
> be called a 'weak' ranked method, but a ranked
> method, nonetheless.
>
> --
> == Eric Gorr ========= http://www.ericgorr.net ========= ICQ:9293199 ===
> "Therefore the considerations of the intelligent always include both
> benefit and harm." - Sun Tzu
> == Insults, like violence, are the last refuge of the incompetent... ===




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