[EM] Arrow's Theorem - The Return (again)
Eric Gorr
eric at ericgorr.net
Mon Aug 4 10:07:02 PDT 2003
A
At 9:23 AM -0400 8/4/03, Stephane Rouillon wrote:
>Alex Small a écrit :
>
>> Can I please get some back-up here? Somebody, anybody, please back me up
>> on this? I can't believe how difficult it is to drive home the point that
> > Approval Voting is not a ranked method.
>>
>Approval is not a ranked method.
>It allows to represent preferential ballots that contain only one
>preference symbol: (A=B=C=...=D) > (E=F=G...=H)
>So Approval allows to represent equal rankings, but it
>does not allow to represent ballots containing many
>preference symbols (>).
Approval is a ranked method by Arrow's Axioms
which only requires voters express their opinion
on the comparison between candidates through the
following relation:
For all x and y, either x R y or y R x
Now, since R can be either '=' or '>', Approval
does not violate this. At best, it could probably
be called a 'weak' ranked method, but a ranked
method, nonetheless.
--
== Eric Gorr ========= http://www.ericgorr.net ========= ICQ:9293199 ===
"Therefore the considerations of the intelligent always include both
benefit and harm." - Sun Tzu
== Insults, like violence, are the last refuge of the incompetent... ===
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