[EM] Arrow's Theorem - The Return (again)

Eric Gorr eric at ericgorr.net
Mon Aug 4 10:07:02 PDT 2003


A
At 9:23 AM -0400 8/4/03, Stephane Rouillon wrote:
>Alex Small a écrit :
>
>>  Can I please get some back-up here?  Somebody, anybody, please back me up
>>  on this?  I can't believe how difficult it is to drive home the point that
>  > Approval Voting is not a ranked method.
>>

>Approval is not a ranked method.
>It allows to represent preferential ballots that contain only one
>preference symbol: (A=B=C=...=D) > (E=F=G...=H)
>So Approval allows to represent equal rankings, but it
>does not allow to represent ballots containing many
>preference symbols (>).

Approval is a ranked method by Arrow's Axioms 
which only requires voters express their opinion 
on the comparison between candidates through the 
following relation:

   For all x and y, either x R y or y R x

Now, since R can be either '=' or '>', Approval 
does not violate this. At best, it could probably 
be called a 'weak' ranked method, but a ranked 
method, nonetheless.


-- 
== Eric Gorr ========= http://www.ericgorr.net ========= ICQ:9293199 ===
"Therefore the considerations of the intelligent always include both
benefit and harm." - Sun Tzu
== Insults, like violence, are the last refuge of the incompetent... ===



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