[EM] Re: Bucklin-Condorcet PR (also Bucklin PR)
Chris Benham
chrisbenham at bigpond.com
Mon Aug 11 22:27:11 PDT 2003
Previously, on Friday, August 8, 2003 I posted a suggested
ranked-ballot PR method that combines Generalized Bucklin and Condorcet.
It wrongly included: "Equal preferences are divided into equal fractions
(which sum to 1)". I now think it is fine if equal preference for A and
B are counted Approval-style as a whole vote for each.
With this mistake removed, this is my proposal again:
Ranked ballots, equal preferences ok. Count the first preference votes.
.If any candidates have a Droop quota they are elected, and then reduce
the values of the ballots which have elected members by an amount which
sums to a Droop quota.
If more than one place remains unfilled, proceed to to the second
round. Add the second preference votes to the first preferences (based
on the value of the ballots after the any reductions that were made the
previous round). If this gives any candidate a Droop quota, then elect
the candidate with the highest tally. If there is a tie, then elect the
tied candidate who had the bigger tally at the last round, if still
tied then the round before that if there was one, otherwise the
Condorcet winner of the tied candidates based on the ballots after the
most recent devaluations. Reduce the value of the ballots that elected
this winner by an amount that sums to a Droop quota. If there is still
more than one place unfilled and if after the latest devaluing of
ballots any candidates have a Droop quota, then elect the one with the
highest tally (same tie-breaking proceedure) and so on.
If there is more than one place to be filled, then add the third
preference votes to the tallies of first and second preferences and if
that gives any candidate a Droop quota, then as before the candidate
with the highest tally is elected and so on.
If proceeding in this way leads to the situation where there is one and
only one more place to be filled, then based on the ballots after all
the devaluations elect the Condorcet Winner.
A more simple, pure GB-style method would be to fill the last seat by
Generalized Bucklin (GB) as well. In the following examples I will give
both results.
This example is lifted from a June 2002 UK Electoral Reform Society
article "Sequential STV - a new version":
2 seats, 5028 votes, 5 candidates.
1248: A>B>C>D>E
1236: B>C>D>A>E
1224: C>D>B>A>E
1212: D>B>C>A>E
36: E>A>B>D>C
36: E>C>D>B>A
36: E>D>C>B>A
Droop quota =1676.
First round: A: 1248 B:1236 C:1224 D:1212 E: 108
No candidate has a Droop quota, so the second preference-level votes
are added, to give
Second round: A: 1284 B: 3696 C: 2496 D: 2472 E: 108
If any candidate has a quota, elect the one with the highest total.
Here 3 candidates have a quota, B has the highest total so is elected.
All those ballots which helped elect B, i.e. those that give first or
second preference to B, are now all reduced in value by a Droop quota,
so that they now sum 3696 - 1676 = 2020. So for example with the
election of B and the subsequent devaluations, the 1248 ABCDE ballots
become 1248/3696 x 2020 = 682 ACDE ballots. So after these
devaluations the votes
now are :
682: A>C>D>E
1900 :C>D>A>E
662: D>C>A>E
36: E>A>D>C
36: E>C>D>A
36: E>D>C>A
On these ballots C still has a quota and so is elected, making the
result BC (agreeing with both plain and Sequential STV).
The second example is taken from the same source, and is the same as
the first except that all those voters who ranked E last now rank E
second. The first round is the same.
First round: A: 1248 B: 1236 C:1224 D: 1212 E:108
No Droop quota, so add the second preference-level votes:
Second round: A:1248 B:1236 C:1260 D:1248 E: 5028
E is first or second on all the ballots! So E is elected, and there is
now no point in devaluing ALL the ballots. On the original ballots,
disregarding E, B is the CW and also the Bucklin winner so both the PR
methods elect E and B.
Sequential STV also elects EB, but plain STV elects BC as before.
Chris Benham.
.
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