[EM] Query for Approval advocates

[John B. Hodges]

Consider the voting method, "Generalized Bucklin", which AFAICT may 
be the same as "Majority Choice Approval": Voters submit ranked 
ballots, which may include ties, and need not list all candidates. 
First-choice votes are tallied; if any candidates get votes from  a 
majority (more than 50%) of the voters, the one with the largest 
majority wins. If none get a majority, second-choice votes are 
tallied and added to the first-choice totals; again we look for the 
largest actual majority. If there is none, third-choice votes are 
tallied, and so forth.

(1) What are the properties of this method, regarding the usual 
desiderata of voting methods? Monotonicity, Independence of 
Irrelevant Alternatives, Condorcet-efficiency, Always chooses 
Condorcet-winner/Never chooses Condorcet-loser, Favorite Betrayal, 
incentives for insincere ranking of preferences, and all of those?

(2) Do Approval advocates regard this method as better or worse than 
plain-vanilla Approval? Why or why not?
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John B. Hodges, jbhodges@  @usit.net
Do Justice, Love Mercy, and Be Irreverent.