[EM] Smith Sets with >3 members

[Markus Schulze]

Dear Forest,

you wrote (27 Feb 2002):
> Markus wrote (27 Feb 2002):
> > Forest wrote (26 Feb 2002):
> > > It seems to me that another problem of Copeland methods is that they
> > > encourage favorite betrayal in the same way IRV does: if your compromise
> > > has a better chance of winning the election than your favorite, but your
> > > favorite has a good chance of beating your compromise, then you (and like
> > > minded voters) vote your compromise above your favorite to maximize your
> > > compromise's chance of getting one more win.
> >
> > In so far as Copeland is monotonic, you cannot increase your favorite's
> > chance of winning the elections by voting another candidate above your
> > favorite.
> 
> But you can increase your compromise's chance by voting you compromise
> above your favorite.

Yes, but this is true for every Condorcet method.

Blake Cretney calls this strategy "compromising". Every Condorcet method
is vulnerable to "compromising".

Markus Schulze