[EM] Smith Sets with >3 members

[Forest Simmons]

On Wed, 27 Feb 2002, Markus Schulze wrote:

> Dear Forest,
>
> > It seems to me that another problem of Copeland methods is that they
> > encourage favorite betrayal in the same way IRV does: if your compromise
> > has a better chance of winning the election than your favorite, but your
> > favorite has a good chance of beating your compromise, then you (and like
> > minded voters) vote your compromise above your favorite to maximize your
> > compromise's chance of getting one more win.
>
> In so far as Copeland is monotonic, you cannot increase your favorite's
> chance of winning the elections by voting another candidate above your
> favorite.

But you can increase your compromise's chance by voting you compromise
above your favorite.

If you think your favorite can beat your compromise but has little chance
of winning the election, then your best strategy may be to vote compromise
over favorite, depending on the relative utilities involved.

Forest