[EM] Consensus?: IRV vs. Primary w/Runoff

Forest Simmons fsimmons at pcc.edu
Mon Feb 4 13:50:48 PST 2002


On Mon, 4 Feb 2002, Markus Schulze wrote:

> Dear Forest,
> 
> you wrote (4 Feb 2002):
> > It seems to me that election methods can potentially have two kinds of
> > problems with clones: (1) Some methods tend to give an advantage to
> > parties that runs lots of clones. (2) Other methods tend to penalize
> > parties that run lots of clones.
> 
> Actually, there are three problems with clones. Blake Cretney
> calls these problems "teaming," "crowding" and "vote-splitting":
> http://www.fortunecity.com/meltingpot/harrow/124/defn.html
> 
> IRV is immune from all three clone strategies.

Well, I guess my lack of clone expertise is showing :-)

> 
> ******
> 
> You wrote (4 Feb 2002):
> > Nurmi rates both Top Two Runoff and IRV at level IV (Roman Numeral Four)
> > in his classification.  Approval is rated at level II, which means he
> > considers Approval two levels more manipulable than IRV, because Approval
> > strategy is that much simpler. But you are right that Nurmi should
> > consider Top Two Runoff as more manipulable by his criterion. Perhaps
> > he does, but not enough to put it at level V.
> 
> I guess you mean: "Perhaps he does, but not enough to put it at
> level III."

That's what I meant, since more manipulable corresponds to a lower number
in their hierarchy.

Thanks for catching that.

Forest



More information about the Election-Methods mailing list