[EM] Consensus?: IRV vs. Primary w/Runoff
Markus Schulze
markus.schulze at alumni.tu-berlin.de
Mon Feb 4 13:39:18 PST 2002
Dear Forest,
you wrote (4 Feb 2002):
> It seems to me that election methods can potentially have two kinds of
> problems with clones: (1) Some methods tend to give an advantage to
> parties that runs lots of clones. (2) Other methods tend to penalize
> parties that run lots of clones.
Actually, there are three problems with clones. Blake Cretney
calls these problems "teaming," "crowding" and "vote-splitting":
http://www.fortunecity.com/meltingpot/harrow/124/defn.html
IRV is immune from all three clone strategies.
******
You wrote (4 Feb 2002):
> Nurmi rates both Top Two Runoff and IRV at level IV (Roman Numeral Four)
> in his classification. Approval is rated at level II, which means he
> considers Approval two levels more manipulable than IRV, because Approval
> strategy is that much simpler. But you are right that Nurmi should
> consider Top Two Runoff as more manipulable by his criterion. Perhaps
> he does, but not enough to put it at level V.
I guess you mean: "Perhaps he does, but not enough to put it at
level III."
Markus Schulze
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