[EM] Consensus?: IRV vs. Primary w/Runoff

[Markus Schulze]

Dear Forest,

you wrote (31 Jan 2002):
> The more manipulable a method is, the easier it eliminates the
> sincere Condorcet Winner. A method that places a premium on
> first place preferences and still eliminates the CW, even when
> the CW has the greatest first place preference, is a very
> manipulable method. That's IRV. As Mike noted, primary with
> runoff will not eliminate the CW if it has the greatest number
> of first place preferences.  Even if the CW comes in second
> place in number of first preferences, it will still win.
> That's a pretty good indicator of the relative manipulability
> of the two methods.

That's hardly an argument. Also IRV chooses the Condorcet
winner whenever he gets to the final round. I rather consider
IRV to be less manipulable than primary with runoff because
IRV is independent from clones. Which important criterion
does primary with runoff meet that is not met by IRV?

Markus Schulze