[EM] Re: The Allure of IRV

[Dave Ketchum]

On Fri, 26 Apr 2002 17:44:07 EDT DEMOREP1 at aol.com wrote:

> Mr. Ossipoff wrote in part-
> 
> I guess my main concern with Condorcet proposals is that it takes
> some listening, some attention, some study, for a person to understand
> why one rank-count is better than another. I just don't know if
> enough people will make that effort. 
> 
> ---
> D- Your average friendly citizen-neighbor does NOT have the 200 (???)  plus 
> political I.Q.'s of the folks on the EM list.


This only becomes a problem if the geniuses from the EM list are unable to 
translate their thoughts into words others can understand.

Seems to me that usable discussions among plurality, approval, IRV, and 
Condorcet are not that difficult.  Be a favor to this audience to not 
discuss the zillion other methods that could confuse them.
      Note:  If there is something hidden out there that would really be 
better for this audience, let us discuss it.

> 
> About 40 percent of our fellow citizens are functional illiterates (for a 
> variety of reasons).  I guess that another 30 percent are only slightly 
> better in the reading area.
> 
> Thus -- the only the standard KIS principle (Keep It Simple) likely has a 
> chance for election method reforms in *real* public elections.
> 
> History indicates the super- deadly danger of having *strong* executives 
> having legislative powers -- Napoleon, Hitler, Stalin, etc.
> 
> Which election methods will reduce / increase the chances of getting such 
> types of folks in high offices again ???
> 
> Is Approval rather simple (even for the above circa 70 percent of folks -- 
> and even if it produces *dull* compromise folks) ???


I claim that approval is both weak enough for many of these to notice, 
and more difficult than its backers are willing to admit:
      Weak because, if I approve of two candidates, I CANNOT indicate my 
preference between them.
      More difficult because where, in the scale between like and dislike, 
is the point where I should stop approving candidates?

IRV and Condorcet use identical ballots and, usually, proclaim identical 
winners.  What they share:
      As with plurality I can skip voting in this race.
      As with plurality I can vote for a single candidate.
      I can vote for two candidates.  Likely reason for wanting this is to 
be able to:
           List first my true preference, demonstrating liking for this 
candidate even if I have little expectation of winning.
           List second my best liked among those with a good chance of 
winning, thus having a good chance of affecting the result.
      I can vote for as many candidates as I choose.  I am not approving, 
just putting them in order according to which I most desire to elect.  I 
show equal dislike for all I do not list.

Condorcet backers claim advantages over IRV by Condorcet's looking at 
whole ballots while IRV only looks at the currently top name in each ballot:
      Usually they select the same winner, having similar ability to 
ignore fringe candidates, this process usually leaving only two final 
candidates to choose between.

     Sometimes more than two candidates get significant votes.  These can 
be distributed in a way that will confuse IRV's procedure of looking only 
at the visible first preference.  Condorcet, by looking at the whole 
ballot, is immune to this confusion.  For example, after discarding fringe 
votes we see:
     40% vote for C, the conservative candidate.
     15% vote for L, the major liberal candidate.
     20% like L, but like even better XL, an extremist liberal, and vote 
for both.
     25% like L, but like even better PL, a progressive liberal, and vote 
for both.
     Here IRV will see the 40% C, 25% PL, 20% XL, and 15% visible L; 
discard those L votes, discard the XL votes and the L votes behind them, 
and declare C the winner.  Condorcet will see the 60% L, discard XL and PL 
as each less liked than C or L, and correctly declare L the winner.

-- 
  davek at clarityconnect.com    http://www.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
   Dave Ketchum    108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708    607-687-5026
              Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
                    If you want peace, work for justice.

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