[EM] falsifying voters' rankings--no.

[Michael Rouse]

----- Original Message -----
From: "Adam Tarr" <atarr at purdue.edu>
To: <election-methods-list at eskimo.com>
Sent: Tuesday, April 09, 2002 9:50 PM
Subject: Re: [EM] falsifying voters' rankings--no.
>
> >We thus have the following ordering:
> >(C,V) S
> >V S C
> >S (V, C)
>
> Vanilla is the Condorcet winner.  Chocolate is the Condorcet loser.  No
> need to assume preferences among the voted indifferences.  Perhaps an
> example that truly produces a circular tie would be more illustrative.

True enough. It's possible this method might have no effect, in which case
it's a complication (which is better than being a problem I suppose). I'll
have to play with the numbers a bit and see.

>
> Also, your example supposes we can have two winners.  Nobody has seriously
> advocated the use of Condorcet voting in multi-winner elections.  So, for
> the sake of applicability, I'd suggest making single-winner examples to
> test your idea.

The main argument against using Condorcet in multi-winner elections is that
a bare majority of voters can force a larger majority of representatives if
they vote in a block. On the other hand, using Condorcet in multi-winner
district may be a bit more representative than any method using
single-representative districts, so there's a tradeoff.

> I would advise you take a serious look at your method before you advocate
> it strongly.  Lots of intuitively appealing ideas actually open the door
to
> strategic manipulation rather than create more democratic results.
>
> -Adam

It's possible that it would have little or no result in elections -- it very
well might be useless. If it does encourage fully-ranked ballots, this would
make the overall election less manipulable for each voter.

Michael Rouse
mrouse at internetcds.com