[EM] falsifying voters' rankings--no.

[Adam Tarr]

>We thus have the following ordering:
>(C,V) S
>V S C
>S (V, C)

>We thus have the following ordering:
>(C,V) S
>V S C
>S (V, C)

Vanilla is the Condorcet winner.  Chocolate is the Condorcet loser.  No 
need to assume preferences among the voted indifferences.  Perhaps an 
example that truly produces a circular tie would be more illustrative.

Also, your example supposes we can have two winners.  Nobody has seriously 
advocated the use of Condorcet voting in multi-winner elections.  So, for 
the sake of applicability, I'd suggest making single-winner examples to 
test your idea.

>I'll need to look closer at Condorcet (wv) to form an opinion, though I
>don't doubt it's an excellent method (I generally like Condorcet methods
>anyway, though Approval is probably as complicated as the electorate can
>handle). Still, I will say that rewarding ties, truncations, and masking of
>voter preferences over full and complete preference lists would seem to be 
>a flaw in an election method. Better to punish for a lack of relevant
>information rather than too much.

I would advise you take a serious look at your method before you advocate 
it strongly.  Lots of intuitively appealing ideas actually open the door to 
strategic manipulation rather than create more democratic results.

-Adam